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Protection is the mechanism employed by operating systems to control access to resources. 
Object encapsulation in object-based systems requires control of access to every object. The 
incremental definition of objects through inheritance and type hierarchies is an important aspect 
of object-oriented systems. This dissertation examines the relationship between protection and 
object-oriented hierarchies. Splitting object-oriented hierarchies across protection boundaries 
is particularly attractive for the purposes of providing a uniform programming model to object-
oriented applications and for implementing a minimal object-oriented kernel. 
After surveying current research and providing a background for discussion, this disserta-
tion presents a detailed analysis of the issues relating to splitting object-oriented hierarchies 
across protection boundaries. The analysis is independent of language, operating system, and 
protection model. The analysis reveals the precautions that must be taken to guard against 
protection violations. The analysis also shows that in the general case an object must be able 
to be split across the protection boundaries, and that the child portion of the object should 
delegate or forward unrecognized method calls to the parent portion of the object on the other 
side of the boundary. 
A practical implementation of object-oriented hierarchies across protection boundaries is 
presented. The implementation uses C++ and the Choices object-oriented operating system. 
The implementation is based on proxy objects and a partitioned rings of protection model. 
Proxy objects are automatically allocated, validated, and stripped off to provide an interface 
that is transparent to the programmer. A tool called Proxify++ assists in providing necessary 
information to the run-time system. Examples of the use of the implementation are provided, 
and experience gained by moving the filesystem hierarchy outside of the kernel is presented. 
Performance of the implementation is also evaluated, and calls to the kernel are found to 
be comparable to operating systems that are not object-oriented. Performance for calls to 
intermediate rings is found to be superior to calls to separate address spaces. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In the context of programming systems, protection is the mechanism used to control access of 
programs and users to resources, including data [PS85]. Protection is often introduced to ensure 
integrity, to prevent inappropriate use that would intentionally or unintentionally compromise a 
resource access policy that is beneficial to the users of a system. Protection may also be used to 
ensure security, but this is a broader topic than the issues addressed in this project. My research 
is concerned with protection and the design of an operating system that supports an object-
oriented interface to applications. This work examines the relationship between protection and 
object-oriented systems. 
Protection can be enforced by convention or agreement amongst the users of the system 
to program in a specific manner, by a compiler that statically checks protection rules are 
not violated or inserts run time checks to verify that the access rules are not violated at 
execution time, or by hardware that absolutely prevents violation of access rules at execution 
time. Protection by convention can easily be violated. Similarly, protection by compilers 
depends on the effectiveness and correctness of the compiler, the nature of the language, and 
whether multiple languages are used to build applications. Hardware-enforced protection offers 
more integrity for access policies and can be applied to more general access problems. 
In object-oriented systems, encapsulation [Nie89] is the major programming protection 
mechanism that restricts manipulation of objects defined in the representation of an abstract 
data type from being accessed except by a set of predefined methods or operations. Encap-
sulation is beneficial because it reduces coupling between modules, encouraging modification, 
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reuse, porting, and understanding. Encapsulation can be enforced in the same ways as general 
protection: by convention as in languages that do not have features that are object-oriented, 
by compiler as in Smalltalk [GR83, Gol84], or by hardware, as in various capability-based com-
puter architectures. Where capabilities are not built into a hardware architecture, hardware 
protection may also be provided by a combination of hardware and operating system primitives. 
For example, the supervisor/user state distinction or virtual memory mechanism may be used 
to provide hardware-enforced encapsulation. 
Encapsulation is, however, only one aspect of an object-oriented system. As denned by 
[Weg87], objects in object-oriented systems belong to classes and class hierarchies that can be 
incrementally denned by an inheritance mechanism. These hierarchies are an important aspect 
of object-oriented systems and greatly facilitate reuse through the development of frameworks 
[JR91]. This research examines extending these hierarchies across protection boundaries. 
1.1 Motivation 
An object-oriented operating system, like any object-oriented program, is made up of many 
object-oriented hierarchies. There are two important motivations to extend these object-
oriented hierarchies across the protection boundaries that an operating system places around 
itself: 
1. This extension will provide applications which are based on an object-oriented program-
ming paradigm with a uniform programming model as they interface with the operating 
system. It will enable the applications to interface with objects, methods, and inheritance 
rather than the traditional procedure call. 
2. The ability to split object-oriented hierarchies across protection boundaries is attractive 
as a mechanism to structure the operating system itself into more-privileged and less-
privileged portions. Keeping the most highly privileged kernel of an operating system to 
a minimum has been proven to be a good way to structure an operating system. Allowing 
object-oriented hierarchies to extend out of the protected kernel will make it easier to 
move portions out of or into the kernel. It will also make a uniform programming model 
as the portions of the operating system outside of the kernel interface with the kernel, 
and as the kernel interfaces with the rest of the system. 
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An object-oriented hierarchy can be split across a protection boundary by either allowing 
parent classes to operate on both sides of the boundary or splitting up the parent and child 
classes in the hierarchy so that they operate on different sides of the boundary. For example, a 
general purpose class such as a class that defines linked lists may be defined inside an operating 
system; if an application makes a subclass of that class it is simplist to copy the parent class 
so the parent operates directly in the application rather than requiring protection boundary 
crossings for inherited behavior. On the other hand, a class that implements an operating 
system service such as a semaphore must remain protected when an application makes a sub-
class because the service will need to have access to protected shared operating system data 
structures. This second kind of hierarchy split is a harder problem than the first. Both kinds 
are useful. 
Splitting object-oriented hierarchies across protection boundaries has not been significantly 
researched before this work. Protection systems in the past have either been designed using the 
function call paradigm as an interface or using the object-based paradigm with no inheritance 
hierarchies. Research is needed to discover the relationship between protection and object-
oriented hierarchies. 
1.2 Thesis 
The focus of this research is the development and study of a mechanism to support object-
oriented hierarchies across protection boundaries. The mechanism should strictly enforce pro-
tection and yet be as transparent as possible to the programmer to allow a uniform object-
oriented programming model. In addition, the mechanism must have adequate performance so 
as to not preclude its use. 
The mechanism that I designed and implemented fulfills these requirements. Applications 
not only can interface with system objects as if they are local objects, they can also incremen-
tally modify the behavior of the system objects for their own use through inheritance. The 
operating system can also take advantage of the inclusion polymorphism of type hierarchies 
to define interfaces through which it can call out to less-privileged subtypes. The mechanism 
automatically and transparently inserts and removes special objects called proxy objects which 
are used to cross a protection boundary and to invoke methods on individual objects on the 
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other side of the boundary. The performance of crossing protection boundaries is adequate: 
method invocations into the kernel with no parameters takes approximately the same amount 
of time as a Unix1 system call, and the extra time taken for allocation and removal of proxy 
objects for parameters and return values is not detrimental because those operations only oc-
cur on a relatively small percentage of calls in a typical application. My implementation also 
uses intermediate rings to support structuring of the operating system into kernel and non-
kernel portions; calls to the intermediate rings take more time than calls to the kernel, but 
they are faster than calls to separate address spaces because message passing is not required. 
The implementation is for the C++ object-oriented language [Str86, Jor90] and the Choices 
object-oriented operating system [CJR87, CRJ87, CJMR89, Rus91, RMC90]. 
The study of this mechanism has led to an analysis of the fundamental problems caused by 
splitting type hierarchies and inheritance hierarchies across protection boundaries. The analysis 
is independent of language, system, and protection model. The analysis reveals the precautions 
that must be taken to guard against protection violations in an object-oriented system with 
protection boundaries. The analysis also shows that in the general case an object must be 
able to be split across the protection boundaries, and that the portion of the object belonging 
to a child in an object-oriented hierarchy should delegate or preferably forward unrecognized 
method calls to the parent portion of the object on the other side of the boundary. 
1.3 Motivating Examples 
In this section I propose a few motivating examples for the desire to split object-oriented hier-
archies across protection boundaries. While developing the Choices object-oriented operating 
system, other developers and I have encountered several categories of situations in which it 
would be helpful to extend the object-oriented hierarchies out of a protected kernel. 
1.3.1 Providing System Services 
The first category involves providing system services to object-oriented applications in an object-
oriented manner. For example, if the operating system provides a Process class to represent 
processes, user programs should be allowed to invoke methods on a Process object as easily as 
'Unix is a trademark of AT&T. 
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the kernel itself can. This example does not show an extension of an object-oriented hierarchy 
across a protection boundary, but it does show the use of an object across a boundary. 
1.3.2 Cus tomiz ing Services a t User Level 
The next category involves customizing operating system services at the user level. For example, 
there is an OutputStream type in Choices that has a writeQ method to send data to the stream 
and a flushQ method that is called when data is to be written out. We would like to be able to 
provide a BufFeredOutputStream in user space that overloads the write() and flushQ methods to 
save data in a local buffer and reduces the number of times that system calls need to be made. 
The BufFeredOutputStream should be a subtype of OutputStream so the user can treat it as an 
OutputStream through the inclusion polymorphism of the type hierarchy. This example also 
shows an extension of the implementation hierarchy in that BufFeredOutputStream inherits some 
methods from its parent OutputStream. The BufFeredOutputStream example is best implemented 
by copying the code for the parent OutputStream class into the application because the parent 
class code does not need to cause any side effects in the operating system. 
We would also like to be able to provide applications with the ability to make a subclass 
of a class that implements an operating system service and cannot be copied to an application 
because it needs to continue to cause side effects in the operating system. For example, the 
code for the Semaphore class cannot be copied into an application because it needs to be able 
to modify protected operating system data that is shared between applications. We would like 
to be able to provide a UserSemaphore subclass of Semaphore that redefines methods to avoid 
system calls if a resource is known to be free, and only calls the parent methods in the operating 
system when necessary. 
1.3.3 Cus tomiz ing Services a t an Intermediate Level 
Another category involves having a minimal kernel and moving many shared system services 
into an intermediate protection level. The kernel will be protected from the intermediate system 
services, and the intermediate system services will be protected from user programs. There are 
many advantages to a minimal kernel as will be discussed in section 2.5. 
When there are more than two levels of protection, there will be cases where a type is 
defined on one level, a subtype is defined on another level, and the type or subtype is used on 
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a third level. For example, there is a Timer type in Choices that defines start() and awaitQ 
methods. We want to define the Timer type at the minimal kernel level, define a subtype called 
TimeoutTimer at an intermediate level, and allow the user level to use the TimeoutTimer type 
and treat it as a Timer through inclusion polymorphism. 
1.3.4 Separating Policy from Mechanism 
The final category is that of providing a mechanism at a protected lower level and a policy at 
a less-protected higher level. For example, we want to allow higher levels to control the policy 
of handling page faults. The kernel will define an interface type called FaultHandler and define 
methods implementing the default policy for handling a page fault. User programs will be able 
to make a subtype of FaultHandler and request the kernel to invoke methods on the subtype 
through inclusion polymorphism. 
This same kind of feature could be provided without using subtypes, but using subtypes 
and polymorphism takes advantage of the object-oriented programming paradigm. 
1.4 Overview 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives background and 
definitions for following discussions and explores related work. Chapter 3 presents the analysis 
of splitting object-oriented hierarchies across protection boundaries. Chapter 4 is a high-level 
description of the implementation of object-oriented hierarchies across protection boundaries 
in the Choices operating system. Chapter 5 presents simple examples of split hierarchies in 
this system. Chapter 6 discusses experience in moving the Choices filesystem out of the kernel. 
Chapter 7 describes specific low-level details of the implementation, intended as a guide for 
those who desire to completely understand and modify the implementation. Chapter 8 discusses 
performance implications. Finally, chapter 9 draws conclusions from this work and proposes 
further research. 
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Chapter 2 
Background 
This chapter contains background information for the rest of this dissertation by describing the 
notation that I use, by defining terms, by discussing concepts of protection, operating systems, 
and object-oriented programming, and by exploring the similarities and differences between my 
research and related work. 
These are the purposes of this chapter: 
1. To provide background for understanding my analysis and implementation of object-
oriented hierarchies across protection boundaries. 
2. To show the previous work from which my research has benefitted. 
3. To show that research on the topic of object-oriented hierarchies across protection bound-
aries is needed because the topic has not been significantly researched before this work. 
2.1 Notation 
These are the fonts that will be used in this dissertation and their meanings: 
Italics - for defining terms and for the name Choices. 
Bold - for language keywords and access rights. 
Sans serif - for class, method, function, and variable names. Methods and functions are followed 
by a pair of parentheses (). 
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Teletype - for instances of the named class. 
CAPITALS - for macros and defines. Macros are followed by a pair of parentheses (). 
2.2 Object-Oriented Operating System Protection 
Protection in object-oriented operating systems is defined in terms of objects, subjects, protec-
tion domains, and processes [PS85]. 
object - A unit of data. In object-oriented systems, the term takes on additional meaning: 
objects are encapsulated such that only the classes that "own" them may manipulate 
them. Some people define objects in object-oriented systems to also include the operations 
(code) with which they are encapsulated, but for the purposes of discussing protection in 
this dissertation, operations will not be considered to be part of an object. 
subject - A unit of code. In object-oriented systems, the implementation of the operations 
(methods) of each class is a subject. 
protection domain - A list of access rights to objects. Each subject is associated with one 
protection domain that specifies the access rights that the subject has to objects. There 
can be more than one subject and/or object for each protection domain, and objects can 
be in one or more protection domains. Multiple access lists are often viewed together 
in matrix form; such a matrix is called an access matrix. In this work, the access rights 
that I am concerned with are the ability to modify objects (that is, both read and write 
access rights together) and the ability to execute methods on objects (the execute access 
right). 
process - A thread of control. Processes wind their way through different subjects. Subjects 
can do nothing without a process to activate them. Processes change protection domains 
as they change from one subject to another. Changing from one protection domain to 
another is called crossing a protection boundary. This occurs at the time a process calls a 
method on an object that belongs to a subject in a different protection domain from the 
one it was executing in, assuming that the process has the execute right on that object. 
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After the process crosses the protection boundary, its rights are amplified such that the 
new protection domain includes the right to modify the object. (The notion of ampli-
fication was first introduced in Hydra [Wul81].) The new protection domain may also 
contain new rights to other objects, but the called method receives a pointer to the object 
as a parameter so it can restrict itself to only modify that object. When the method 
is finished, the process returns back across the protection boundary and reverts to the 
protection domain without the amplified rights. 
At any given time, a process should be allowed to access only the objects that it needs to 
get its job done. This is called the need-to-know principle, and it is useful in limiting the 
amount of damage that flawed code can cause. 
2.3 Trust 
In an operating system environment, different kinds of trust relationships exist between subjects. 
For example, subjects in a kernel are more trusted than subjects in applications, and subjects 
in different applications do not usually trust each other. 
Figure 2.1: Trust Relationships 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the trust relationships that can exist between subjects. Circles repre-
sent subjects, boxes represent collections of objects, and arrows indicate read and write access 
rights to an object in the protection domain of a subject. Table 2.3 shows the same information 
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in the form of an access matrix for the protection domains; D12 is the protection domain of Si 
and S2, D3 is the domain of S3, D4 is the domain of S4, and D5 is the domain of S5. 
D12 
D3 
D4 
D5 
C12 
read-write 
C3 
read-write 
read-write 
C4 
read-write 
read-write 
C5a 
read-write 
read-write 
C5b 
read-write 
read-write 
read-write 
Table 2.1: Access Matrix for Trust Relationships 
These are the trust relationships between two subjects: 
more trusted - The more trusted subject is able to modify all objects belonging to the less 
trusted subject. The protection domain of the more trusted subject is a superset of 
the protection domain of the other subject. SI and S2 are more trusted than the other 
subjects in the figure. They could be two parts of the kernel of an operating system. 
less trusted - The converse of more trusted: the protection domain of the less trusted subject 
is a subset of the protection domain of the other subject. 
partially trusted - The partially trusted subject is able to modify some of the objects that 
belong to the other subject but not all. S5 partially trusts S4; S4 has access to C5b but 
not C5a. They could be two applications that are working together and have some shared 
virtual memory. 
mutually distrusted - Mutually distrusted subjects do not trust each other with any of the 
other's objects. S3 and S4 mutually distrust each other. They could be two independent 
applications. 
mutually trusted - Mutually trusted subjects trust each other with all of each other's objects. 
They both have the same protection domain. SI and S2 mutually trust each other with 
their collection of objects in C12. 
When any two subjects do not mutually trust each other, a protection boundary is placed 
between them so that when a process crosses from one subject to the other the process will 
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have the proper access rights (that is, the process will be in the proper protection domain). 
When one subject is more trusted than another subject, the protection boundary prevents the 
less trusted subject from modifying the objects belonging to the more trusted subject; with 
this kind of a trust relationship, the two subjects are at different protection levels because one 
is more protected than the other. 
Even though trusted subjects can modify the objects that belong to subjects that trust 
them, that does not mean they will modify the objects. Trust simply implies that one subject is 
willing to accept that the other subject will abide by any compile-time or run-time enforcement 
of object encapsulation. 
These trust relationships exist regardless of how fine-grained or coarse-grained the protection 
mechanism is. That is, whether the objects are individually protected through capability-based 
hardware or protected as a group through some other means, the analysis of chapter 3 still 
applies. 
2.4 Proxies 
My work makes extensive use of proxy objects. Proxy objects are objects that represent other 
objects. All interactions with objects that are not in the same protection domain or address 
space of the user go through proxy objects. The use of the term in object-oriented systems was 
first introduced in [Sha86] with the following "proxy principle": "In order to use some service, a 
potential client must first acquire a proxy for this service; the proxy is the only visible interface 
to the service." Proxies forward calls to the real objects and are indistinguishable from the real 
objects from the client's point of view. 
Proxies in Choices (first introduced in [Rus9l]) are a specialization of the general proxy 
concept. Proxies in the general case can represent any number of objects, and the objects 
can be distributed onto different machines. They can also be independently implemented for 
each different kind of server object. Systems that use these general proxies are SOS [SGM89], 
Comandos [MG89], and HCS [Not87]. In my work in Choices, proxies represent only one object 
on the same machine, and they are identically implemented no matter what kind of object they 
represent. 
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The proxy concept was extended by SOS to include a concept of Fragmented Objects 
[SGH+89]. In that system an individual logical object can be distributed across multiple 
machines, with a fragment of the logical object on each machine. My system also supports 
fragmenting a logical object into two or more parts: when a class is subclassed outside of the 
protection domain it is defined in, the portions of the object belonging to the parent and child in 
the different protection domains are fragmented into those different domains. SOS considers a 
proxy to be a fragment of the object that it represents, but in my system proxies are considered 
to be only the mechanism (along with inherited method stubs) that ties the fragments of the 
object together so they appear to the client to be a single object. 
2.5 Minimal Kernel 
A primary motivation for my research is to assist in creating a minimal kernel. A minimal 
kernel, or microkernel, contains only the essential system services necessary to convert bare 
hardware into a small number of abstractions. Any services that can be performed outside of the 
kernel without significantly degrading performance should not be a part of the kernel. Minimal 
kernels typically provide basic services such as process management, memory management, and 
inter-process communication. 
A minimal kernel has several advantages over a large, monolithic kernel: 
1. Since a minimal kernel is smaller, it is easier to develop, debug, and maintain. Debugging 
a kernel can be very difficult because all of the code executes at the highest privilege level, 
and errors often crash the entire system. The more complex the kernel, the more chance 
that serious errors will occur. 
2. A minimal kernel encourages the separation of policy and mechanism. Separation of policy 
and mechanism is very important to achieve modularity and flexibility in an operating 
system [WCC+74]. The kernel provides the mechanism, and the policies are implemented 
outside of the kernel. 
3. Since most of the operating system services are implemented outside of a minimal kernel, 
those services can easily be updated or new services can be added without the need to 
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recompile the kernel or reboot the system and without jeopardizing the integrity of the 
entire system. This is especially valuable for embedded systems that require high uptime. 
4. A minimal kernel makes it possible to run variations of the same operating system or 
totally unrelated operating systems on the same machine. This is especially valuable for 
a research environment where the operating system changes often and different program-
mers have their own versions of the operating system. 
Many other modern operating systems incorporate the minimal kernel concept; examples 
include Mach [R+89], V [CZ83], Amoeba [TM86, MvRT+90], and a kernel for Clouds called Ra 
[B A+89]. None of these systems are object-oriented, but the advantages of a minimal kernel are 
still applicable to object-oriented systems. Mach, V, and Amoeba are message-based systems. 
Even though the Ra kernel is written in C++, it is only object-based outside of the kernel, not 
object-oriented. 
2.6 Protection Model 
My implementation uses a combination of a rings of protection model and a capabilities model. 
Both of these models have been widely used in other systems. The combination of the two 
models fits well with introducing protection boundaries into object-oriented languages that are 
based on one large shared address space. 
2.6.1 P r o t e c t i o n Rings 
In a system that incorporates protection rings, each process executes in a protection ring that 
determines which objects it can access. The innermost ring has the greatest access rights. Each 
successive ring restricts access further. A process can only enter into further-in rings through 
controlled access points. 
MULTICS [Org80] was the first system to use protection rings. MULTICS employs a large 
number of protection rings (32) and assigns specific services to each ring. The disadvantage 
of a large number of rings is that it becomes difficult to hierarchically order services; the 
interdependencies between services can get in the way. My implementation can accommodate 
any number of rings, but I anticipate that only a very small number will be used, perhaps three 
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or four. The most essential portions will remain in the kernel ring and the remainder will be 
placed in one or two rings outside of that with applications in the outermost ring. 
VAX/VMS [KB84] does not use the ring terminology, but it employs four protection levels 
which are essentially the same as rings. In addition, the kernel address space is shared between 
all applications. My system also shares address space; the address space of each inner ring is 
shared with all further-out rings. The address space of further-in rings is shared but is not 
accessible to the further-out rings. The advantage of the sharing is that, when a process crosses 
into a further-in ring, then the address space of the ring that the process came from is directly 
accessible for manipulation by the inner ring. 
My system also includes the ability to partition any ring other than the kernel into separate 
independent address spaces. It is common practice to be able to partition the outermost 
(application) ring into separate address spaces, but the ability to flexibly partition inner rings 
is novel to this work. 
2.6.2 Capabi l i t ies 
Capabilities [Lev84, BS88, Dei84] are protected pointers that provide rights to access individual 
objects. A proxy in my system is a capability that provides a partition of one ring the right to 
invoke methods on an individual object in another ring. 
Capability-based systems typically use fine-grained protection and require every access to 
every object to go through a capability. The problem with that is that the management of 
the capabilities becomes far too complex, and special-purpose hardware is required for efficient 
implementation. Even with special-purpose hardware there is overhead to check the protection 
on every access. My implementation avoids much of that overhead by grouping collections of 
objects together into a partition of a ring using conventional virtual memory hardware. Once 
a process has gained access to an object in another partition of another ring through a proxy, 
the process may then go on to access any other object in that partition without going through 
another proxy. 
Many systems have been developed that incorporate the capabilities concept of protecting 
objects separately. Many of them provide a separate address space for every object using 
conventional virtual memory hardware. Examples include Amoeba [TM86], Clouds [DLA88, 
PD88], COOL [HM90] (based on Chorus) and Eden [ABLN85]. Using conventional virtual 
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memory hardware to protect each object individually is not well suited for small variably-sized 
objects because every object must take up a multiple of a fixed page size. Also, separate page 
tables need to be maintained for every object. Eden goes further and uses active objects, where 
each object has a process associated with it as well as an address space; communication is done 
via message passing. My system uses passive objects that are manipulated through method 
calls by independent processes. 
BiiN [PJC + 90, PKD+90] is a modern system that incorporated capability-based hardware. 
In the BiiN architecture, the capabilities implemented by the hardware are called access de-
scriptors. Objects can be of any size from 64 bytes to 4 gigabytes, and up to 22 6 objects can 
be actively addressed by a process. This hardware virtually eliminates the problems of wasted 
space and time that plague systems that protect individual objects with conventional hardware. 
However, funding was removed from BiiN in late 1989 and interest in capability-based hardware 
has been fading since. 
None of these systems are truly object-oriented, they are all object-based. In other words, 
they do not incorporate inheritance and class hierarchies. If they were to extend their systems 
to incorporate inheritance, they would have to deal with most of the same issues that I address 
in my research. 
2.7 Extending Object-Oriented Operating Systems 
There are two systems in the literature that extend object-oriented hierarchies beyond an 
object-oriented operating system. 
Comandos [MG89, GM89] is one such system. A major goal of Comandos is to provide 
an integrated computational model for programmers of object-oriented applications as they 
interact with the operating system. The designers of Comandos intend to provide support 
for multiple object-oriented programming languages. Inheritance is supported by having an 
implementation contain only the subset of operations defined by a type, and by keeping the 
operations defined by the type's supertype in a different implementation object. My system does 
this also. Few details of how Comandos does the split are provided in the literature, however. 
Work has proceeded in the development of a language called OSCAR that transparently takes 
advantage of the Comandos inheritance structure; Guide [KMV+90] is a language that is an 
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exploratory implementation of some of the OSCAR features. Comandos is not a self-contained 
system, it runs on top of other systems: a minimal kernel called IK, and Unix. 
Muse [YTT89, YTM+9l] is the other system. Muse has a reflective architecture that is 
designed to be easily modifiable and optimizable for the needs of applications. Muse is based 
on a meta-object hierarchy initially with three levels: the object level is the equivalent of 
application level, the meta-object level is an intermediate level, and the meta-meta-object level 
is the equivalent of kernel level. Each object is active (that is, has its own process) and is rather 
large-grained in its own address space. A delegation mechanism implements an object-oriented 
hierarchy between the objects, but few details are provided and examples only show delegation 
between objects in the meta-object layer. 
Both of these systems have only briefly addressed the problems of object-oriented hierarchies 
across protection boundaries. These systems show that there is interest in the topic, but more 
research is needed. 
2.8 Extending C + + 
Several systems in the literature extend the C++ language to support more than a single, large, 
statically compiled address space. 
Extended C++ [Sel90] supports remote procedure calls in C++. It is implemented as a 
translator that translates a superset of C++ into ordinary C++ on top of Unix. It adds a 
remotable keyword to mark methods that can be called remotely. This is analogous to the 
proxiable keyword in my system which marks methods that can be called from outside of a 
compiled module. Extended C++ extends the language further to bundle together parameters 
to be sent along with the remote procedure call, including hand-written encoders and decoders 
for parameters that have a complex structure. That is not necessary in my system because 
called methods have direct access to the address space of the caller if the caller trusts the called 
method. 
The SOS system [SGM89] permits migration of objects from one machine to another in 
a distributed system. SOS is implemented with a modified C++ compiler and runs on top of 
Unix. The modified C++ compiler supports a dynamic keyword that is used to instantiate an 
object that can migrate across address spaces. Rather than having hand-written encoders and 
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decoders for parameters like Extended C++, SOS uses a hand-written proxy for each object 
type which is specialized for the methods and parameters that the object accepts. 
A system that allows adding code to a running C++ program is described in [DSS90]. That 
system uses first-class classes (objects that represent classes at run-time [IL90]) to keep track of 
C++ class hierarchies, as does my system. However, that system does not provide any protection 
between already running parts and newly loaded parts. The system also runs on top of Unix. 
2.9 Implementation Hierarchies and Type Hierarchies 
There are two kinds of hierarchies in object-oriented systems: implementation hierarchies and 
type hierarchies [Lis87]. Implementation hierarchies are hierarchies in which code and data im-
plementations are shared through inheritance. A child in an implementation hierarchy contains 
all of the methods and data of its parent(s) but can replace some of the methods and can add 
new methods and new data. 
By contrast, type hierarchies are hierarchies in which calling signatures and semantic mean-
ings of methods are shared. Calling signatures are the method names, parameters, and return 
values that are supported by a type. A child (subtype) in a type hierarchy has methods with 
the same names, parameters, and return values as its parent(s) (supertype(s)), and each of the 
matching methods perform similar operations. A child can also have additional methods. 
Type hierarchies are used for inclusion polymorphism [CW85]: where a particular set of 
operations is required, a type that has those operations or any of its children in the type 
hierarchy can be employed. 
In object-oriented languages that have the concept of classes, the implementation hierarchy 
follows the class hierarchy. In some of those languages the type hierarchy also always follows 
the class hierarchy, but in other languages the type hierarchy can be independent of the class 
hierarchy. An example of the former is C++, and an example of the latter is Smalltalk because 
it employs dynamic type checking1. In any case, the distinction is a useful one and I will use it 
in the analysis. 
1
 Smalltalk does not enforce any hierarchy on types. Instead, evety method invocation is handled independently' 
and the object responds if it has defined a method of that name. This is known as the grouping approach [Lis87], 
Nevertheless, a type hierarchy inherently exists. 
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2.10 Inheritance, Delegation, and Forwarding 
Inheritance and delegation are two ways of looking at object-oriented implementation hierar-
chies. The Treaty of Orlando [LSU87] distinguishes between inheritance and delegation; when I 
use the two terms in this dissertation, the distinguishing property is whether the sharing in the 
implementation hierarchy is static or dynamic. That is, inheritance specifies that the sharing 
pattern is statically determined by the time an object is created, and delegation allows the shar-
ing to be determined dynamically during run-time. C++ and Smalltalk are inheritance-based 
languages, and Self [US87, CUL89] is a delegation-based language. 
The way that delegation-based languages provide dynamic determination of the sharing 
pattern is by giving each level of the implementation hierarchy a separate object, and forwarding 
unrecognized methods to the parent object. The parent object can be changed at any time by 
choosing to forward methods to a different object. 
True delegation is more than just forwarding a method call to the parent object [Lie86]. 
In true delegation (and inheritance), if a child overloads a method that its parent invokes, the 
child's version of the method will be used. That is, the method gets invoked on the original 
object. On the other hand, if method calls are simply forwarded to the parent object, the 
parent would only invoke its own version of the method. Figure 2.2 pictures the distinction 
between delegation and forwarding. 
Figure 2.2: Delegation and Forwarding 
Suppose a parent defines a method Ml that invokes another of its methods M2, and its child 
redefines method M2. When a call to Ml comes to the child, it will forward the call to its parent 
because the child does not have an Ml. With simple forwarding, the parent will invoke its own 
M2, but with delegation, the parent will invoke the child's M2. Delegation-based languages 
implement this by sending a reference to the child object ("self") along with the method calls 
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that are delegated to the parent object, and by always beginning with the child object when 
invoking methods. 
2.11 Summary 
This chapter has provided background for understanding my analysis and implementation of 
object-oriented hierarchies across protection boundaries. It has also shown the previous work 
from which my research has benefitted. Most importantly, it has shown that research on the 
topic of object-oriented hierarchies across protection boundaries is needed because the topic 
has not been significantly researched before this work. 
19 
Chapter 3 
Analysis 
The intention of the analysis in this chapter is to expose the general principles that I have 
learned by implementing a system that supports object-oriented hierarchies across protection 
boundaries. These general principles are applicable to any object-oriented language, any oper-
ating system, and any protection model. 
The analysis begins by examining objects protected by protection boundaries, moves on to 
type hierarchies split across protection boundaries, and finishes with implementation hierarchies 
split across protection boundaries. A summary of the principles learned is at the end of the 
chapter. 
3.1 Using Objects Protected by Boundaries 
Before examining the splitting of object-oriented hierarchies across protection boundaries, I will 
first address the concerns caused by using objects that are protected by protection boundaries. 
For example, an operating system may contain many objects that are of various types in a 
type hierarchy; how should the operating system protect itself while providing services? In 
other words, what precautions need to be taken when an untrusted subject calls a method 
on an object? Precautions are necessary to prevent the untrusted subject from circumventing 
protection by taking advantage of the amplified access rights in the protection domain of the 
called method. 
20 
3.1.1 Method Calls on Selected Objects 
The first principle is that an untrusted subject should only be able to invoke methods on selected 
objects; that is, the protection domain of the subject must have the execute right for those 
selected objects. This follows directly from the need-to-know principle. Since calls to methods 
in different protection domains first cross over to the object's protection domain, untrusted 
subjects should not be allowed to call methods on all objects in a system. A subject will want 
to selectively give away the right for untrusted subjects to execute methods on its objects. For 
example, referring back to figure 2.1, suppose there are two untrusted subjects S3 and S4 that 
mutually distrust each other and a trusted subject Si that is more trusted than both. In that 
case, SI might give away the right to execute methods on one object to S3 and give away the 
right to execute methods on a different object to S4, but not give away the right to execute the 
same object to both untrusted subjects. Also, SI may have some objects that should not be 
accessible by any untrusted subject. 
3.1.2 Selected Method Calls on Objects 
The second principle is that an untrusted subject should only be allowed to invoke selected 
methods on the objects that are accessible across protection boundaries. This also follows from 
the need-to-know principle. Programmers often want to have methods that are only used for 
internal purposes. Also, methods that are callable across protection boundaries must be written 
with the awareness that callers are not to be trusted: for example, parameters may need to be 
checked to ensure that they are within a valid range. 
Thus, a subject should be able to give away selectively access rights to execute specific 
methods when it gives away execute rights on its objects. If a special mechanism does not 
exist, a programmer could introduce an intermediate object that only exposes the methods to be 
callable across boundaries and forwards method calls to the real object, but that is inconvenient. 
3.1.3 Parameters Referring to Other Objects 
Some methods accept parameters that refer to other objects. Presumably the methods will 
use the references to invoke methods on the other objects. An untrusted caller must therefore 
not be allowed to pass in a reference to an object that the caller has no right to access. For 
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example, some methods in Choices accept parameters that refer to OutputStream objects, and 
then invoke the writeQ method on those objects to write out messages to output devices or files. 
An untrusted caller must not be permitted to pass in a reference to an OutputStream object 
that can write to a privileged file into which the caller is not authorized to write. 
In addition, an untrusted subject must not be permitted to pass in an object of an incorrect 
type. A correct type is either the type that the called subject expects or a subtype in the type 
hierarchy. If an object of an incorrect type were allowed to be passed through to the called 
subject, the methods that the called subject expects to be available on the object would not 
be available. For example, if a method was expecting an object of type OutputStream and the 
untrusted caller instead tried to pass in an object of type InputStream, the write() method would 
not be available on the object. In a language that has no run-time type checking (such as C++), 
this could cause severe consequences; it could even cause the system to crash. Run-time type 
checking is required for parameters from untrusted callers. 
3 .1 .4 C r e a t i o n a n d D e l e t i o n of O b j e c t s b y U n t r u s t e d S u b j e c t s 
The next question is whether a subject should be able to create or delete objects belonging to 
subjects that do not trust it. The creation and deletion of objects must be under the control 
of the subjects that own them, but a subject should be able to selectively give away the right 
for untrusted subjects to create its objects and to delete objects so created. Often objects exist 
to provide services for the untrusted subjects, and the untrusted subjects need to be able to 
request more services or relinquish services. 
3.2 Type Hierarchy Split Across Protection Boundaries 
Object-oriented systems use the type hierarchy to provide inclusion polymorphism. Subtypes in 
a hierarchy can transparently take the place of supertypes. Additional concerns are raised when 
a subtype and a supertype in the type hierarchy are defined on different sides of a protection 
boundary. 
Consider first the case where the caller of a method expects a type that is defined on the 
other side of a protection boundary but instead a subtype is substituted on the same side as 
the caller. For example, suppose an operating system defines a supertype called Semaphore 
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and an application defines a subtype called LoggingSemaphore that redefines the methods of the 
supertype, and then the application treats a LoggingSemaphore object as if it were a Semaphore 
object. This does not cause any problems; a call to one of those methods will simply not cross 
the protection boundary. 
On the other hand, consider the case where the substitution of a subtype causes an un-
expected protection boundary crossing to an untrusted subject. For example, suppose an 
operating system was expecting an object of type Semaphore and instead the object was of type 
LoggingSemaphore and defined by an application. In some ways this is like a trojan horse, with 
an untrusted object masquerading as a trusted object. This may be useful in some circum-
stances, but in general such substitutions of untrusted subtype objects should be restricted for 
two reasons: 
1. Parameters need to be chosen with care. Parameters to a call to an untrusted subject are 
like return values from a call from an untrusted subject. If a parameter refers to another 
object, passing a reference to that object can give away access rights to that object, and 
that should only be done if the caller intends to give away the rights. 
2. Return values need to be restricted. Return values from a call to an untrusted subject are 
like parameters to a call from an untrusted subject. Values may need to be range-checked, 
and return values that refer to other objects need to be verified for accessibility and type 
as discussed in section 3.1.3. 
3.3 Implementation Hierarchy Across Protection Boundaries 
What happens when an implementation hierarchy is split across protection boundaries? Not 
only code is shared in an object-oriented implementation hierarchy. Each level of the hierarchy 
may also add data items (member variables) to the definition of objects. The data items added 
for a particular level are primarily intended to be accessed and modified by the code for that 
level of the hierarchy, although some languages make exceptions and allow code further down 
the hierarchy to modify the data. (C++ even goes so far as to allow parts of some objects, the 
pub l i c parts, to be modified by any subject.) 
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3.3.1 Unified or Split Objects 
Should the portions of an object belonging to the different levels in the implementation hier-
archy be placed in one protection domain or should the object be split so it can be placed in 
different domains? Languages such as C++ and Smalltalk place objects in contiguous memory. 
If protection hardware is not fine-grained enough to distinguish between portions of an object, 
it is not possible to place portions of a single object in different protection domains. 
3.3.1.1 Parent More Trusted than Child 
Consider first the case of a two-level implementation hierarchy where the parent is more trusted 
than the child. That is, the parent's protection domain includes all of the access rights of the 
child's protection domain and more. Figure 3.1 shows the different possibilities. The boxes are 
protection domains and the circles are objects. Sp is the parent subject, Sc is the child subject, 
0P is the portion of the object belonging to the parent, and Oc is the portion of the object 
belonging to the child. 
^77 
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Figure 3.1: Unified or Split Objects 
Assume that an entire object, both parent and child portions, must be in contiguous memory 
and that an object can only be protected by hardware in a single protection domain. In which 
protection domain should the object then be placed? 
The first possibility is to have the parent use only the child's protection domain and then 
place the object in that domain. Figure 3.1a shows the parent subject having the ability to use 
either the more powerful domain or the more restrictive domain. Using the more restrictive 
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domain would prevent the parent from causing any side effects that the child could not cause 
itself. This can be easily implemented by essentially making a copy of the code for the parent 
subject and giving the copy the same protection domain as the less trusted child subject. This is 
appealing for the cases in which it may be applied because no protection boundaries need to be 
crossed, which improves performance. However, it is too restrictive for the general case because 
the parent might need to cause side effects that are only possible in the more powerful protection 
domain; for example, objects representing operating system services such as Semaphore objects 
will need to be able to cause side effects on other operating system objects such as P rocess 
objects which represent processes. 
The second possibility is to leave the parent in the more powerful protection domain and 
place the entire object in that domain as in figure 3.1b. Clearly, this is not appropriate because 
the child would be prevented from manipulating its own portion of the object. The child in an 
implementation hierarchy defines its own portion of an object and the parent has no knowledge 
of the structure of the child's portion so the child must be able to modify that portion. 
Therefore, if the object must be in a single protection domain and the parent needs to be 
able to be in a more powerful protection domain, the object should be placed in the child's 
protection domain where it is accessible by both the parent and the child as in figure 3.1c. In 
that situation the parent cannot trust that the child has left the parent's portion of the object 
intact because the child has complete access to the object. This is acceptable only if one of the 
following special cases is true: 
1. The parent has not defined any data in the object. If there is no data, there is nothing 
for the child to modify. Few situations are covered by this case because classes usually 
define data; however, it is easy for the compiler or run-time system to verify whether the 
parent has defined data. 
2. The parent causes no side effects based on the data in the object that the child does 
not have the right to cause itself. For example, the parent might only modify the object 
itself, not other objects or other protected data that the parent has the ability to modify, 
such as "class" data ("class" data is global information for a class). If a parent can cause 
side effects on protected data, the less trusted child can circumvent the protection by 
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manipulating the parent's portion of the object. This can cause the parent to modify the 
protected data to the child's advantage. 
3. At the beginning of every method call, the parent validates the data that it has defined in 
the object to ensure that any side effects that the parent will cause will not violate trust. 
For example, perhaps some data items will cause correct operation if they are within a 
particular range of values. If that is so, the parent must check to make sure the data 
items are still within the correct range; it cannot trust that the data items have been left 
intact because the less trusted child may have modified them. 
The latter two cases cannot be automatically enforced, so they require careful analysis by 
the programmer for each situation and are prone to error. In addition, even the last case 
does not guarantee correct operation in all situations: if the child cooperates with another 
concurrent thread of control, the other thread could modify the data during the execution of a 
parent method after the parent had verified the data. 
The same analysis applies to a multi-level protection hierarchy at the points at which the 
trust levels change, not just a two-level hierarchy, The analysis can be applied iteratively. 
Thus, placing the entire object in a single protection domain is not appropriate for the 
general case in an implementation hierarchy where child subjects are less trusted than their 
parent subjects. 
3.3.1.2 U n t r u s t e d P a r e n t s a n d M u t u a l D i s t r u s t 
Up to this point I have only been analyzing the case where a parent is more trusted than a 
child. Does it make a difference if the child in the implementation hierarchy does not trust its 
parent? This could be the case if either child and parent mutually distrust each other or if the 
child is more trusted than the parent1 . 
Essentially, these variations make very little difference to the results of the analysis. If 
the parent is less trusted than the child the roles would simply be reversed in the analysis. If 
mutual distrust existed between the parent and the child, the possibilities are more restrictive 
1
 Practically speaking, it is not very likely that a child will be more trusted than its parent; for example, an 
operating system is not likely to make a subclass of a class defined in an application. However, it is theoretically 
possible. 
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than a more-trusted/less-trusted relationship: a unified object would have to be made acces-
sible to both the parent and child, and they would both have to protect against unauthorized 
modification by the other by verifying the data on every method call, which in general is not 
practical. 
Thus the result of the analysis is the same no matter what the trust relationships are: 
objects should be able to be split across protection boundaries. 
3.3.2 Objects Split Into Different Protection Domains 
Since placing an object in a single protection domain is not appropriate in all cases when an 
implementation hierarchy is split into different protection domains, objects should be split into 
the different protection domains as in figure 3.1d. The portions of the object that belong to 
each level in the implementation should be placed in the protection domain of the subject they 
belong to. The child then delegates or forwards methods it does not recognize to its parent. 
Additional problems are caused by splitting an object into different protection domains. 
Some inheritance-based languages allow child subjects to access directly the data members of 
parent objects. Clearly this cannot be allowed across protection boundaries. It is not usually 
allowed in delegation-based languages, and [Sny86] advocates that all access to parent instance 
variables should be through methods cv(>n when protection boundaries do not exist [Sny86]. 
Some languages also distinguish between methods that are callable only by child subjects 
and methods that are callable by all subjects, for example C++ with its protected and public 
methods. Unfortunately, this cannot bo strictly enforced across protection boundaries because 
an extra child can be easily created that makes the protected methods available to other sub-
jects. Language restrictions can still be used, but programmers of the more trusted subjects 
should not assume that enforcement of the restriction is strict. 
Another question is whether true delegation should be used between the child object and 
the parent object as opposed to simple forwarding. If true delegation is used, a method call 
by the parent object could result in a call back to the child object if the child overloaded a 
parent method. Since the parent does not truBt the child in this case, it may be that forwarding 
is better to prevent the parent from invoking an untrusted method when it is expecting a 
trusted method. Method calls to untrusted subjects have to be handled carefully, as discussed 
in section 3.2. Changing an inheritance hierarchy into a hierarchy that uses forwarding would 
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change the semantics that delegation would have preserved, so it may not always be preferable 
to use forwarding, but delegation across a protection boundary should not be used blindly to 
replace inheritance. 
3.4 Summary 
These are the general principles exposed by this analysis: 
1. Untrusted subjects should be permitted to invoke methods only on objects to which they 
have obtained access rights. 
2. Untrusted subjects should be permitted to invoke only selected methods on the objects 
to which they have access. 
3. Objects passed in as parameters to a method call across protection boundaries should 
be validated to ensure that the caller has the right to use those objects. In addition, if 
the objects that are passed as parameters do not trust the caller, the objects should be 
validated to ensure they are of a type that the called method expects. 
4. Untrusted subjects should be permitted to create only objects that belong to subjects that 
have chosen to allow it. Untrusted subjects should only be permitted to delete objects 
that they have created. 
5. The object types that can be polymorphically replaced by an object of an untrusted 
subtype should be restricted to only selected types. 
6. If an implementation hierarchy is split across protection boundaries, the portions of the 
objects belonging to the parent and child should be handled in one of two ways: 
(a) If the parent does not need to cause side effects in its own protection domain, the 
parent should instead restrict itself to the child's protection domain so that the 
complete objects can be placed in that domain. 
(b) If the parent does need to cause side effects in its own protection domain, the objects 
should be split so that the parent's portions are in the parent's protection domain 
and the child's portions are in the child's protection domain. Method calls that the 
child does not implement should be delegated or preferably forwarded to the parent. 
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Chapter 4 
The Choices Implementation 
This chapter is a high-level description of the implementation of object-oriented hierarchies 
across protection boundaries in the Choices operating system. This implementation has been 
designed using the principles discussed in chapter 3. Details of the implementation are in 
chapter 7. 
The purpose of this implementation is to develop a working model of a mechanism that 
supports object-oriented hierarchies across protection boundaries. The model should be useful 
as a vehicle to study the general problems of splitting object-oriented hierarches and as an 
example to be imitated in other object-oriented languages and systems. The goals of this 
implementation are as follows: 
1. To support the strict enforcement of protection. An untrusted user must not be able 
to circumvent the mechanism to abuse protected resources. This is not to say that an 
implementor of a protected resource cannot inadvertently allow protection violations by 
careless implementation of methods, but the mechanism itself must not be able to be 
compromised and it should assist the implementors of the protected resources whenever 
the assistance can be feasibly provided. 
2. To provide language transparency whenever possible. Language transparency is necessary 
to provide a uniform object-oriented programming paradigm. 
3. To perform adequately. The time taken to cross protection boundaries should be similar 
to non-object-oriented systems that provide protection. 
29 
4. To provide more than two protection levels. This is not of essential importance to the 
implementation, but it is included to improve the generality of the mechanism and to 
enable the structuring of the operating system into more-protected and less-protected 
portions. 
The two major constraints on this implementation are the use of the C++ language and the 
use of traditional processor hardware. Choices is written in C++, and a transparent C++ inter-
face across protection boundaries is desired. Choices currently runs on National NS32332 and 
Intel 80386 processors, so the only hardware protection available is the memory management 
units and, in the case of the Intel 80386, segmentation. 
C++ does not make a distinction between the implementation hierarchy and the type hier-
archy, which simplifies my implementation. On the other hand, the compile time type-checking 
of C++ complicates my implementation because no information about the types of objects is 
available at run time. To get around that deficiency, Choices keeps track of the type hierarchy 
with first-class classes [IL90, MCK91], 
4.1 Protection Model 
The protection model that I have chosen is a partitioned rings of protection model. Each 
successive outer ring is less trusted than the further-in rings. Furthermore, each ring can be 
partitioned into mutually distrustful regions. In order to make the interface as transparent 
to C++ as possible, address spaces are shared across rings although rings cannot access the 
addresses of further-in rings. Partitions within a single ring share the same range of virtual 
addresses, but represent different memory in different address spaces. 
Figure 4.1 shows an example with four rings of protection. A partition of one ring is called a 
ring-partition (a ring-partition corresponds to a Domain in C7io»ces[RJC88, RC89]). The number 
in each ring-partition is the ring number, and the letters represent the partition identifier. The 
last letter in each identifier distinguishes a ring-partition from other ring-partitions that belong 
to the same partition of the next inner ring. The other letters identify the ring-partition in the 
next inner ring. Ring-partitions 3aba and 3abb share the same range of virtual addresses and 
mutually distrust each other, and ring-partition 2ab is mapped into the address space of both 
of them and is more trusted than both of them. 
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F i g u r e 4 . 1 : Four Partitioned Protection Rings Example 
These are the reasons why this model of protection was chosen: 
1. Due to the nature of the C++ language and our protection hardware, fine-grained pro-
tection is not practical. Instead, objects and subjects are grouped into relatively large 
portions that trust each other. Within a group of objects, no protection check overhead 
is incurred to invoke methods. 
2. Providing intermediate protection rings allows efficient implementation of an object-
oriented minimal kernel with shared services outside of the kernel. Layering the trust 
levels is efficient because it enables inner shared levels to use shared memory semantics 
rather than message passing semantics. That is, if the shared services are forced to be 
placed at the outer level in their own address spaces, messages have to be sent to them 
to gain access to their services. If they are at an inner trust level, they have direct access 
to the memory of the users they serve. 
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Additional intermediate protection rings could be useful to application developers who 
desire the ability to add their own protected services which are shared across several 
higher-level applications. 
Both incalls from outer rings to inner rings and outcalls from inner rings to outer rings 
are supported. However, only incalls (the most common case) can take advantage of the 
shared address spaces. That is, code in an outer ring can pass references to data in its 
own ring-partition and expect the inner ring to be able to access it. Outcalls cannot pass 
references to data in their own spaces and expect the called ring-partition to be able to 
access the data because that would be a protection violation. 
3. The partitioning of the outermost protection ring into separate address spaces that are 
mutually distrustful is common in operating systems. I chose to allow the intermediate 
rings to also be partitioned to enable a protected operating system research environment 
on a running system, and to allow higher-level shared application libraries to coexist on 
the same system without having to trust each other. 
Even though any number of rings are allowed and even though any ring other than the 
innermost ring can be partitioned, I expect that the most useful configuration will be three 
rings where the intermediate ring contains shared operating system services that are outside of 
the kernel and only the application ring is partitioned, as shown in figure 4.2. 
4.2 Hardware Protection Rings 
The implementation of the partitioned rings of protection is processor dependent. The ideal 
hardware for the implementation of rings would have a protection level for every ring. Un-
fortunately, the processors on which Choices runs directly support only two protection levels. 
However, multiple rings can still be implemented by using some kinds of standard protection 
hardware. Two examples are presented in this section. 
There are two major ways that most modern computer hardware provides protection: 
through paging and segmentation. 
Paging systems provide virtual address spaces by means of page tables. Page tables con-
tain page table entries. In addition to indicating where in physical memory a page resides, 
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Figure 4.2: Basic Ring Configuration 
a page table entry indicates protection on each page. Most modern Memory Management 
Units (MMU's) can indicate whether each page is writable or readable by two protection levels, 
supervisor and user. 
Segmentation systems provide descriptors for each segment of memory. The descriptors 
indicate where a segment begins in physical memory, how long the segment is, and whether the 
segment is writable or readable by different protection levels. 
The requirements of this design call for multiple hardware protection levels with shared 
address spaces. The implementation of proxies (described later) calls for portions of the kernel 
to be readable by all protection levels. Neither a paging system with two protection levels nor 
a segmentation system directly provides for these requirements. 
4.2.1 Rings Using Segmentation and Paging 
Processors such as the 80386 processor provide a combination of segmentation and paging. 
On these processors, creative use of segments can get around the problem of only two paging 
protection levels: the address space of the intermediate protection rings are placed above the 
outermost protection ring in the virtual address space, in reverse order from the outer protection 
rings through the inner protection rings. All protection rings outside of ring zero, the kernel 
ring, are run in user mode on the processor but have different segment descriptors associated 
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with each protection ring. All segments still start at virtual address zero so the kernel space can 
be shared, but the segments are limited in length, thus protecting more privileged data from 
the outer protection rings. Figure 4.3 shows an example address space layout for four rings on 
a system with a combination of segmentation and paging. 
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Figure 4.3: Example Address Space Layout on Segmentation/Paging System 
4.2.2 Rings Using Two-Level Page Tables 
Many processors do not provide segmentation but have a page table arrangement called two-
level page tables. In a two-level page table system, the first level page table points to the second 
level page table and the second level page table points to the pages. The first level page table 
is much smaller than the second level page table, typically only one page. 
For processors with no segmentation but with two-level page tables, multiple protection 
rings are achieved by having multiple first-level page tables per Domain. All rings outside of 
ring zero are run in user mode on the processors but have their own first-level page tables per 
Domain. For example, if there were four total rings, there would be three first-level page tables 
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per Domain. The first-level page tables all represent the same address space but have different 
address ranges accessible to user-mode code. 
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Figure 4.4: Example Two-level Page Table Address Space Views 
Figure 4.4 shows an example of different views of the same address space on a system 
with two-level page tables and two hardware protection levels. The two protection levels are 
called "Kernel" and "User". The example shows four protection rings which requires three 
different views; ring zero can use any of the views because it operates in kernel mode. Each 
view corresponds to a first-level page table. Each first-level page table is divided into four areas 
corresponding to the four rings. Each ring has read/write access to its own space and all further-
out rings. Each rings shows a portion that is read only by user because the implementation 
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of proxies requires a portion of address space in each ring that is readable by user mode but 
writable only by the kernel. 
Loading a new page table at the time of the protection ring switch forces Translation 
Lookaside Buffer caches to be flushed. However, measurements show (see section 8.2) that 
doing so does not add much more time to a proxy call on the processors on which Choices runs. 
Nevertheless, there is some overhead, and hardware that can support multiple protection levels 
without needing to change page tables is better for implementing protection rings. 
4.3 Proxy Objects 
Objects are represented outside of their ring-partitions by proxy objects. A proxy gives a single 
ring-partition the capability to invoke methods on the object it represents. A method invocation 
on a proxy object is a proxy call. Proxies are instances of the ObjectProxy class. The user of an 
ObjectProxy is unaware of its existence and treats it as if it is the real object. The methods 
of ObjectProxy are stubs that are in a portion of the kernel that is readable to all applications. 
These stubs trap to kernel mode and translate the method calls into calls on the real object 
in the appropriate ring. The portion of the kernel that processes the traps is the proxy trap 
handler. 
The real, or proxied, objects are instances of subclasses of the ProxiableObject class. The 
primary purpose of the ProxiableObject base class is to provide reference counting because C++ 
does not have garbage collection.- ProxiableObject defines a reference count variable and methods 
to manipulate the count. 
Objec tProx ies are allocated from the user's ring, but in a section that is read-only and 
controlled by the kernel. Objec tProxies are automatically allocated (or stripped off) by the 
proxy trap handler whenever an instance of a subclass of ProxiableObject is returned from 
another proxy call or passed in as a parameter. If a proxy already exists from the same ring-
partition to the same proxied object, the proxy is reused (it is looked up in a hash table). 
Every application is started with a single proxy to an object called the Sys tomln te r f ace; 
after that the application obtains all proxies through proxy calls. One call that the default 
application initialization code makes is to obtain a proxy for its HameServer. The HameServer 
simply maintains a table that maps strings to particular objects that are instances of subclasses 
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of ProxiableObject and allows applications to look up the objects by name. Since the lookup 
is a normal proxy call, a proxy is automatically allocated for the object when the call returns. 
This is the mechanism used to make objects available so any application can obtain proxies to 
them on demand. 
In addition to being able to obtain proxies to pre-existing objects, a mechanism is provided 
to allow applications to create new objects by using the C++ new keyword on selected classes. 
Using that mechanism creates a protected object and returns a proxy for that object. This is 
discussed further in section 4.4.3. 
4.4 Proxify++ 
To assist with addressing the concerns discussed in chapter 3, I have created a tool called 
Proxify++. This tool examines the definitions of C++ classes and generates information about 
each class. Proxify++ recognizes a new keyword called proxiable that identifies methods and 
constructors that can be used across protection boundaries. This keyword is stripped out by 
the C-preprocessor when the C++ compiler examines the class definitions, so no modifications 
to the C++ compiler are needed. 
An external tool like Proxify++ is only necessary because the C++ language does not have 
enough information available at run-time and is not expressive enough to be able to be extended 
within the confines of the language. A language that was based on the principles of reflection, 
the ability to modify the computational model of a language [Mae87, Fer89], might not require 
an external tool. For example, a language like CLOS [Kee88] has many more reflective abilities 
than C++. 
The proxiable keyword is a hint to the system that the programmer has designed privileged 
code which is safe to be used by untrusted code. The run-time system (proxy trap handler) 
prevents untrusted code from using privileged code that is not marked proxiable. A method 
that is marked with the proxiable keyword is known as a proxiable method, and a class that 
has at least one proxiable method is known as a proxiable class. 
Proxify++ has four outputs: 
1. Proxy table. 
2. Alternate class description header files. 
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3. Constructor stubs. 
4. Method stubs. 
Each output is described more fully in the following subsections. 
4.4.1 Proxy Table 
Proxify++ generates a table of information about each proxiable method. The table, called the 
proxy table, lists the number of parameters and the types of parameters that are pointers, and 
the type of the return value. The methods are grouped by class. 
Figure 4.5: Three rings with proxies 
The proxy trap handler uses this table to look at every parameter and return value to every 
proxy call. Parameters on incalls are treated very much like return values from outcalls, and 
return values from incalls are treated very much like parameters to outcalls. The trap handler 
uses the table to perform the following operations: 
1. First, the proxy trap handler verifies that the caller has the right to make the proxy 
method call. This is the control mechanism mentioned in section 3.1.2. For example in 
38 
figure 4.5, if subject Si uses proxy P10 to invoke a method associated with object OQ, PIO 
is validated to make sure that Si can use it, and the method is verified to make sure it 
was one marked with the proxiable keyword. 
2. Proxies are automatically allocated and stripped off, for both parameters and return 
values. For example, if Si makes an incall to a method of So which returns a pointer to 
OQ, the proxy trap handler will automatically return proxy Pio to Si. If Si later makes 
another call to a different method of So and passes in Pio as a parameter, the proxy trap 
handler will automatically strip off the proxy so So can directly access OQ. 
If Si repeatedly calls the method of So which returns a pointer to OQ, the proxy trap 
handler will reuse the previously allocated Pio proxy rather than continually allocating 
new ones (the object is looked up in a hash table). This is important to prevent using up 
too many proxies on repetitive operations. 
If a third ring were involved, a proxy can be stripped off and another one allocated for 
the same parameter. For example, if P20 is passed as a parameter to an incall from S2 to 
Si, it will be stripped off and Pio will be allocated and passed in its place. This is done 
because proxies only map objects to one partition of one ring. 
3. For all proxies that a subject passes in as parameters or returns, the proxy trap handler 
verifies that the ring-partition that the subject is in has the right to use that proxy. This 
implements the control mechanism of section 3.1.3. For example, if S2 made a call to So 
and attempted to pass in Pio then that call would be rejected because S2 does not have 
the right to use Pio. (In normal operation S2 would never attempt to do use Pio, but the 
programmer of S2 could be maliciously trying to break security). 
4. For proxies to objects that do not trust the caller, the type of the object is checked to 
verify that it is of the correct type or a subtype in the type hierarchy. The need for this 
was discussed in section 3.1.3. For example, if Si calls to So and passes in Pio then 0o 
is checked for type. If an object of type Process were expected and instead O0 is of type 
Semaphore, that would be rejected. (Once again, compiler type checks prevent this from 
happening, but a malicious programmer could circumvent compiler checks). 
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5. The proxy trap handler controls at what point an untrusted subtype can take the place 
of a trusted parent type by only allowing this when the parent's class definition is marked 
with the proxiable keyword. The need for this was discussed in section 3.2. For example, 
say a method on S0 expects a parameter of type Semaphore and Si passes in Oi which is 
an instance of an untrusted subtype of Semaphore. The proxy trap handler would then 
allocate Poi for So to use, but only if the Semaphore class definition has been marked with 
the proxiable keyword; if it has not been marked proxiable then the call is rejected. 
The reason for this is to only allow outcalls to this untrusted object if the Semaphore type 
has been specifically designed to allow outcalls. 
6. If a parameter points to data that is not an instance of a subclass of ProxiableObject, the 
proxy trap handler verifies that the address of the data is in a ring that the caller has the 
right to access. The assumption here is that the amplified-privilege called method will 
read or write at that address and it ought to be an address that the caller may read and 
write. For example, if this check were not performed and Si called in to a method of So 
which reads from a file into a buffer or writes into a file from a buffer, Si could easily 
read or write any value into memory in ring zero by passing in a pointer to memory in 
ring zero. This is a result of sharing addresses between rings. 
Only one level of pointer indirection is allowed for parameters to proxied methods; that 
is, Proxify++ does not allow "**" pointers. The reason for this is that it is impossible in 
C++ to know the format of the data and the checks cannot be performed; in a language 
that had parameters more completely specified this limitation would not be necessary. 
For the same reason, pointers to structures that contain pointers must not be passed to a 
proxy call; Proxify++ does not enforce this, but it is up to the programmer of the trusted 
method to enforce it. 
4.4.2 A l t e r n a t e Header Files 
Another output of Proxify++ is alternate class description header files. These are the class 
descriptions of proxied classes that applications include. Only methods and constructors that 
are marked proxiable are copied to these header files; all other details are removed. This 
allows compile-time checks to notify application programmers if they accidentally try to call 
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methods that are not proxiable or try to use any member variables which are not present in 
the proxy. Since all implementation details are eliminated, the alternate header files have the 
added advantage of preventing recompilation of code that uses a proxied class if the interface 
does not change. 
Alternate header files would of course not be needed for languages such as CLOS which do 
not require class descriptions to be exposed to users of the classes. 
4.4.3 Constructor Stubs and Deletion 
The third output of Proxify++ is constructor stubs. If a constructor is marked as proxiable, 
then an object of that type may be created by another ring. This is the control mechanism 
on creation of objects discussed in section 3.1.4. Proxify++ recognizes proxiable constructors 
specially and prepares a separate list of these constructors. This list is used to create constructor 
stubs to be linked with applications. This enables application programmers to do a new on a 
proxied class as if it were local, and to get back a proxy to the newly created object. 
Proxied objects cannot be directly deleted by users of proxies. When the user of a proxy 
calls the destructor through delete, the proxy is deleted instead. When the proxy is deleted, 
the reference count on the proxied object is decremented by one. (When the proxy was first 
allocated, the reference count on the proxied object was incremented by one because the proxy 
referenced the object). When the reference count on the proxied object becomes zero because 
it is not being used by any other object, the proxied object is then deleted. This ensures that 
an application cannot delete an object that it did not create or that is still in use. 
4.4.4 Method Stubs 
The fourth output of Proxify++ is method stubs. Proxify++ generates these method stubs for 
every proxiable method and they are linked with applications. The purpose of method stubs is 
to be inherited by subclasses of proxiable classes; they are not used by calls directly to proxied 
objects. The method stubs implement the splitting of objects in an implementation hierarchy 
across protection boundaries that was discussed in section 3.3.2. 
Since C++ allocates objects out of contiguous memory, separate C++ objects are used for 
the portions of a class hierarchy on different sides of a protection boundary. The child portion 
of the object inherits method stubs which invoke the appropriate methods on the parent object 
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through a pointer to a proxy to the parent object that is saved in the child object. Space 
for this pointer is reserved in every ProxiableObject, and the pointer is filled in when the 
constructor stub of the proxiable parent class is called by the constructor of the subclass. The 
implementation of ProxiableObject is copied into every application so that is why there are data 
variables in ProxiableObject available for the child portion of the object; this is in contrast to 
non-copied proxied classes which are viewed by applications to have no data variables because 
the applications use the alternate header files which have the implementation details removed. 
Section 5.4 gives more details on how this inheriting of method stubs work. 
Note that this scheme only forwards methods to the parent objects, it is not true delegation. 
That is, once the method has been forwarded to the parent object, and if the parent calls 
another method in the same class that the child has overloaded, the child's method will not be 
invoked. In order to simulate true delegation, a pointer to the original object has to be passed 
as a parameter to the parent method. This is a recognized way to simulate delegation in C++ 
[JZ91]. 
Dynamic determination of parents as is provided in delegation-based languages is not cur-
rently implemented, but it could be provided through the use of a method on ProxiableObject 
that allows an application to set the pointer that is used by the inherited method stubs. 
4.5 Hierarchy of Type Hierarchies 
Every partition of every ring can independently extend the type hierarchy. An extension of the 
type hierarchy in one partition of a ring is not seen by other partitions of that ring. In order 
to keep track of these independent extensions of the type hierarchy, an unusual data structure 
has been put in place that represents this hierarchy of type hierarchies. This hierarchy has a 
type hierarchy for each ring-partition in the ring-partition hierarchy. 
Figure 4.6 shows an example of an extension to the type hierarchy in one application. Each 
class in the type hierarchy is represented by an object that keeps track of types; those objects 
are shown in the figure. Classes that are at points in the type hierarchy that can be extended 
have an object representing them in every partition of each further-out ring; in the figure, 
ProxiableObject, Semaphore, and BinarySemaphore are points in the type hierarchy that are 
exposed outside of the kernel to allow applications to add subtypes. These duplicates maintain 
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Figure 4.6: Example Hierarchy of Hierarchies. 
a pointer to their originals as represented by the dotted lines in the figure. GraciousSemaphore 
is a type that is not exposed outside of the kernel, and LoggingSemaphore is type that is defined 
by an application and unknown to the kernel. 
The operation that checks types follows the dotted-line pointers only in the direction of 
the arrow. In the figure, GraciousSemaphore^ is considered a subtype of Semaphore^ but 
LoggingSemaphore^ is not considered a subtype of Semaphore^. In this way, each application 
can have its own view of the type hierarchy. 
4.6 Implementation Limitations 
I have already pointed out some differences between a normal C++ program that has one large 
unprotected address space and my implementation which splits the program across protection 
boundaries. Here are some additional limitations that I have placed on the implementation. 
These are not fundamental limitations, but I chose them for simplicity: 
1. No direct function calls are supported across protection boundaries, only method calls. 
Traditional operating systems provide only function calls, but since I had the method 
call proxy mechanism in place there is no longer any reason to support ordinary function 
calls. Any miscellaneous function calls can be made to be methods on the Systemlnterface 
class. 
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2. Multiple inheritance across protection boundaries is not supported. Choices does not use 
multiple inheritance and it would introduce significant complexity. 
3. Calls between two unrelated Domains, that is, crosscalls, are not supported. It would 
require a major change to the Choices process subsystem to support that. I think that 
such calls should be implemented like remote procedure calls which switch the processor 
context to a server process rather than staying in the context of one process. 
4. Outcalls are only supported to the Domain that a process was originally created in and 
to Domains that could have been reached through incalls when the process was created. 
For example, if a process that started in a particular application Domain calls a kernel 
method, that method cannot call out to a method in a different application Domain. That 
would have all the same problems as a crosscall. 
4.7 Summary 
This implementation satisfies the stated goals: it supports the strict enforcement of protection, 
provides language transparency, performs adequately, and provides for more than two protection 
levels. The implementation has been useful as a model to study general problems of object-
oriented hierarchies across protection boundaries. 
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Chapter 5 
Examples 
This chapter provides examples of using the proxy subsystem. The examples demonstrate 
concepts that I have described in earlier chapters. 
5.1 Printing a Simple Message 
As every student of Computer Science knows, the first example that should be given for any 
new system should show how to print a simple message. 
#include "OutputStream.h" 
int 
main( int, char ** ) 
•C 
StandardOutput->formattedWrite( "hello sailor!\n" ); 
return( 0 ); 
} 
Figure 5.1: Printing a simple message. 
Figure 5.1 shows how to print a simple message using the proxy subsystem. StandardOutput 
is initialized by application start-up code and points to an instance of BufFeredOutputStream. 
BufFeredOutputStream is defined in application space and is a subclass of OutputStream (a 
subclass of ProxiableObject) which is both defined in the kernel and copied into application 
45 
space. StandardOutput is of type "OutputStream *" so assigning a Buf f eredOutputStream to 
it takes advantage of polymorphism. 
The formattedWrite() method (which is similar to printf() in C) is inherited from Output-
Stream. FormattedWriteQ calls write() to write out the formatted data. Write() is defined 
by BufFeredOutputStream to collect data in a local buffer and to call writeQ on a second 
OutputStream when a newline is reached. 
This second OutputStream is in the kernel, and the Buf f eredOutputStream keeps a proxy 
to that OutputStream. Thus a call to write() on the proxy will trap to the kernel and invoke 
the proxied method there. A pointer to the buffer in the application is passed through, and 
the write() method in the kernel directly accesses the buffer. The proxy trap handler recognizes 
that the pointer parameter is not a subclass of ProxiableObject and verifies that the pointer 
refers to an address in the application's ring. 
Note that because the OutputStream class is both in the kernel and copied into the appli-
cation, the definition of the class is used by the application in this scenario for both a locally 
defined object (the Buf f eredOutputStream) and a proxy. Non-virtual functions on the proxy 
will not trap to the kernel where the proxied object is but instead will execute locally. This 
succeeds in this case because there are no member variables in the OutputStream class for those 
non-virtual functions to work on; the proxy would not contain the member variables if there 
were any. Also, all virtual functions in this class are proxiable so the virtual function numbers 
always match between the application and the kernel. 
5.2 Pointers to ProxiableObjects 
Figure 5.2 shows an example proxy call that both passes in a pointer to a ProxiableObject 
and returns a pointer to a ProxiableObject. 
FreeRunningTimerStar SystemTimer = StandardHameServer-> 
lookup( "SystemTimer", FreeRunningTimerClass ) ; 
Figure 5.2: Example of passing and returning ProxiableObjects. 
StandardNameServer is a variable that is initialized for all applications and points to a 
proxy to the HameServer for that application. FreeRunningTimerClass is also initialized for all 
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applications and points to a proxy to an instance of the kernel class called Class. (The Class 
class is used to keep track of the class hierarchy at run-time, that is, first-class classes.) This 
proxy call to the l\lameServer::lookup() method traps to the proxy trap handler which recognizes 
the two parameters. The first parameter is a pointer to something other than a subclass of 
ProxiableObject; the proxy trap handler range-checks the pointer to ensure that this points to 
the application's space. The second parameter is a pointer to a proxy; the proxy trap handler 
validates the proxy to ensure that it is a valid proxy for the application, and then strips off the 
proxy so lookupQ can directly access the Class object. 
LookupQ looks up the object that had been given the name "SystemTimer" and returns a 
pointer to the object. The proxy trap handler takes that pointer and allocates a new proxy for 
that object and returns a pointer to the proxy instead of the real object. 
The "Star" variable that is assigned the return value in this example is used for reference 
counting. If the SystemTimer variable is deleted or set to zero, the proxy will automatically get 
unreferenced so it can be deallocated. 
5.3 Creating a Proxied Object 
Applications may create proxied objects that are of a class that has a constructor marked 
proxiable. For example, figure 5.3 shows a subset of the header file describing the Semaphore 
class in the kernel. 
#include "ProxiableObject.h" 
c lass Semaphore : public ProxiableObject { 
protected: 
in t count; 
in t maxCount; 
publ ic : 
proxiable Semaphore( in t in i t ia lCount , in t maxCount = 65535 ) ; 
proxiable "SemaphoreO; 
proxiable v i r t u a l void P ( ) ; 
proxiable v i r t u a l void V(); 
>; 
Figure 5.3: Semaphore class description. 
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Proxify++ examines that header file and generates an alternate header file that looks the 
same except that the protected member variables are removed. If there were any non-proxiable 
methods then those would also be removed. 
Proxify++ also generates a constructor stub so an application can create a Semaphore in the 
kernel and obtain a proxy to it. For example, figure 5.4 shows a code fragment that creates a 
Semaphore * sem = new Semaphore( 1 ) ; 
sem->P(); 
de le te sem; 
Figure 5.4: Creation and deletion of a Semaphore. 
proxied Semaphore object in the kernel, makes a call to the P() method, and deletes the proxy 
that is returned. Deleting the proxy deletes the object in the kernel. If the application neglects 
to delete the proxy, the proxy will be deleted when the application exits. 
In addition, it is possible to use the syntax of declaring memory for a proxied object instead 
of creating it with new. Figure 5.5 shows an example of that. This allocates memory on the 
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Semaphore sem( 1 ) ; 
sem.PQ; 
} 
Figure 5.5: Declaration of a Semaphore. 
stack and then calls the constructor stub for Semaphore. The constructor stub traps to the 
kernel to create the Semaphore and gets the proxy. After the trap returns, the stub saves a 
pointer to that proxy in a variable called ".real" which is defined by the ProxiableObject class. 
Then when P() is called, a method stub that was also generated by Proxify++ is called. 
That method stub is shown in figure 5.6. 
The stub simply forwards the call to the proxy. Note that this is less efficient than if the 
object had been created by a new, but the syntax and semantics of a locally declared object 
are preserved. 
At the end of the program block the compiler automatically calls the Semaphore destructor, 
which deletes the proxy, which deletes the Semaphore object in the kernel. 
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void Semaphore::P() { 
return ((Semaphore *) (ProxiableObject *) _real)->P(); 
} 
Figure 5.6: Semaphore::P() method stub. 
A proxied object can also be declared at global scope. If that is done, the constructors of 
the object and the proxy are called when the application is initialized and the destructors are 
called when the application exits. 
5.4 Inheriting Across Protection Boundaries 
Applications may also create subclasses of proxiable classes. Figure 5.7 shows an example. This 
#include "Semaphore.h" 
c lass LoggingSemaphore : public Semaphore { 
protected: 
int V_count; 
public: 
LoggingSemaphore( int initialCount ); 
virtual void V(); 
}; 
void LoggingSemaphore::V() { 
V_count++; 
Semaphore::V(); 
} 
Figure 5.7: Example subclass across protection boundary. 
subclass counts the number of calls to V() and inherits P(). The portion of an instance of class 
LoggingSemaphore that belongs to the subclass, namely the V.count member variable, will be 
in application space, and the portion that belongs to Semaphore will be in the kernel. This 
requires that the parent has a proxiable constructor. 
A new on LoggingSemaphore will call the constructor of LoggingSemaphore. The constructor 
of LoggingSemaphore automatically calls the constructor of Semaphore, which in this case is a 
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stub that traps to the kernel to create the kernel portion of the instance. When the constructor 
stub returns, it fills in the ".real" pointer defined in the application portion of the instance (in 
ProxiableObject). 
Calls to the parent methods go through the method stubs described in the previous section. 
Methods that are not overloaded inherit the stubs, and the stubs forward calls through the 
proxy to the parent object. The explicit call to Semaphore::V() inside of LoggingSemaphore::VQ 
also uses the stub. 
The implementation of ProxiableObject is copied into every application, so that is why the 
".real" variable is available in the application object. Also, that means that the portion of the 
object in the application (the LoggingSemaphore portion as opposed to the Semaphore portion 
which is in the kernel) has its own reference count, and that method calls to methods of 
ProxiableObject apply to the local portion of the object and do not make proxy calls. Only calls 
to the non-overloaded method stub for Semaphore::P() result in proxy calls. 
Note also that the implementation of the portion of the LoggingSemaphore object in the 
application is defined in C++ to have the Semaphore class as a parent class, but that the 
definition of Semaphore that the application sees from the alternate header file has no data 
items, only methods. Therefore no space is reserved in the application portion of the object for 
the Semaphore class, even though space is reserved for the copied ProxiableObject class. 
5.5 Dynamic Determination of Parent 
This is not currently implemented, but a method could easily be provided to allow dynamic 
determination of the proxy parent. An example of this is shown in figure 5.8. 
In the figure, the parent of the LoggingSemaphore is dynamically set to be a different 
Semaphore. The original parent Semaphore and proxy that are created as a side effect of 
creating the LoggingSemaphore are automatically deleted because ".real" is a "Star" variable; 
a "Star" variable automatically unreferences the object that it was originally set to when it is 
re-set. 
This technique could also be used to create an instance of a subclass of a proxied class that 
is not allowed to be created by an application; that is, a class that does not have a proxi-
able constructor. For example, suppose that the Semaphore class did not have a proxiable 
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void 
ProxiableObject::setParent( ProxiableObject * newParent ) 
{ 
_real = newParent; 
} 
Semaphore * semi = new Semaphore( 1 ) ; 
Semaphore * sem2 = new LoggingSemaphore( 0 ) ; 
sem2->setParent( semi ) ; 
Figure 5.8: Dynamically Determining Parent Object. 
constructor but an application could get a proxy to one through its HameServer. Then when 
an application creates a new LoggingSemaphore instance, no Semaphore object and no proxy 
would be created because there will be no constructor stub to call. Instead, a local object 
would be created with only method stubs for the Semaphore methods and a null ".real" pointer. 
However, the created object could still be useful because the setParentQ method could be used 
to point the parent of this object to a pre-existing Semaphore object. 
5.6 Outcalls 
An out call is a method call from an inner ring to a further-out ring. The inner ring obtains a 
proxy to an object in an outer ring through the passing of a parameter that points to the object. 
The inner ring can then use that proxy to make the out call. Figure 5.9 shows an example of 
making an out call. 
The kernel defines the interface to which it will call out. By marking the FaultHandler class 
definition with the proxiable keyword, the kernel indicates that it is willing to accept subclasses 
from outer rings when it expects parameters of type FaultHandler. When the application calls 
setFaultHandlerQ, a proxy to the applications HyFaultHandler is automatically allocated for 
the kernel. SetFaultHandlerQ saves the proxy in the Process object. Later, when a page fault 
occurs, the page fault handler retrieves the proxy from the Process and makes the outcall to 
the application's faultQ method. 
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From kernel header files: 
proxiable class FaultHandler : public ProxiableObject •£ 
proxiable virtual void fault( char * address, 
AccessType attemptedAccess ); 
>; 
class Process : public ProxiableObject { 
proxiable virtual void setFaultHandler( FaultHandler * ); 
proxiable virtual FaultHandler * faultHandler(); 
}; 
From an application: 
class HyFaultHandler : public FaultHandler { 
virtual void fault( char * address, 
AccessType attemptedAccess ); 
>; 
thisProcess()->setFaultHandler( new HyFaultHandler() ); 
From kernel page fault handler: 
thisProcess()->faultHandler()->fault( addr, access ); 
Figure 5.9: Example outcall. 
5.7 Simulating Delegation 
If a parent method in the kernel wants to be able to call a support method which may be 
overloaded by a child outside of the kernel, a pointer to the child object must be explicitly 
passed in to the parent method. Figures 5.10 and 5.11 shows examples of this kind of parent 
and child. 
In this example a call to VQ on a LoggingSemaphore will invoke doVQ in the kernel, passing 
in a pointer to the child object. Note that the Semaphore class has to be marked proxiable for 
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proxiable class Semaphore : public ProxiableObject { 
proxiable virtual void V(); 
proxiable virtual void doV( Semaphore * me ); 
proxiable virtual void supportVO; 
>; 
void Semaphore::V() { 
doV( this ); 
} 
void Semaphore: :doV( Semaphore * me ) •[ 
me->supportV(); 
} 
void Semaphore::supportV() { 
/ * don't do anything, just for overloading by child * / 
} 
Figure 5.10: Example parent class for delegating. 
class LoggingSemaphore : public Semaphore -f_ 
int V_count; 
virtual void V(); 
virtual void supportVO; 
}; 
void LoggingSemaphore::V() { 
doV( this ); 
} 
void LoggingSemaphore::supportVO { 
V_count++; 
} 
Figure 5.11: Example child class for delegating. 
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the kernel to accept a subclass of the Semaphore class from outside the kernel. Then doVQ uses 
that pointer to outcall to the child's supportVQ method. This style of simulating delegation in 
C++ is discussed in more detail in [JZ91]. 
5.8 Multi-ring Hierarchies 
All of the examples I have given in this chapter up to this point have only dealt with two rings, 
kernel and application. Hierarchies can also span more than two rings. For example, a parent 
class can be defined in the kernel, a child class defined in an intermediate ring, and a child of 
that class defined in an application. 
The example Choices application called 'timings' makes use of such a multi-ring hierarchy. 
That application tests and times all possible combinations of incalls and outcalls between three 
rings. It makes use of a Timinglnterface class which is defined in the kernel, a child SubTiming-
Interface class which is defined in the 'loadl' intermediate ring example, and a child of that class 
called SubOutCalllnterface which is defined in the 'timings' application. The concepts are sim-
ilar to the examples which have already been shown so additional figures will not be provided 
at this point. 
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Chapter 6 
Experience Moving the Filesystem 
out of the Kernel 
In order to exercise the proxy subsystem, I did some work to enable the filesystem to operate 
outside of the kernel. The endeavor was successful, although there were several obstacles to 
overcome along the way. This chapter describes experience I gained by moving the filesystem 
out of the kernel to an intermediate ring. 
Running the filesystem in an intermediate ring is a very good example of the use of rings in 
the proxy subsystem. This enables the kernel to be protected from filesystem code while still 
allowing the filesystem to take advantage of kernel services. In addition, the filesystem can still 
directly access memory of its client applications just as it could when it was inside the kernel. 
6.1 Kernel-Specific Pieces Inside Filesystem 
The first problem I ran into was that the filesystem was using PhysicalMemoryChain, a class that 
could not be moved out of the kernel. PhysicalHemoryChains are like pointers that refer to 
physical memory rather than virtual memory. Since it is undesirable to allow rings outside of the 
kernel to have access to physical memory, I removed all knowledge of PhysicalHemoryChains 
from the filesystem. 
The filesystem used PhysicalHemoryChains to enable the virtual memory subsystem to 
use the filesystem to read into a page of physical memory before the page was mapped into a 
virtual address space. I removed that requirement by changing the virtual memory subsystem 
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to pre-map the physical page into a virtual address and then changing the filesystem to use 
only virtual addresses. 
6.2 Splitting the Class Hierarchy 
The next step was to decide where to split the class hierarchy between the kernel and the 
filesystem ring. Figure 6.1 shows a portion of the original class hierarchy and figure 6.2 shows the 
split class hierarchy. For more complete information on the Choices filesystem class hierarchy 
see [Mad92, MLRC88, MCRL89, WBJ90]. 
ProxiableObject 
MemoryRange StoredObject 
MemoryObject MemoryObjectContainer FileStream 
\ I 
PersistentMemoryObject Att6386DiskContainer / X 
Att6386Disk FileObject 
1 / 
MemoryObjectPartition 
Figure 6.1: Portion of Original Class Hierarchy 
In figure 6.2, classes without boxes in the normal font are defined in the kernel only, classes 
with boxes around them are defined in the filesystem ring only, and classes in bold font are 
defined in both rings. Solid lines with arrows indicate parent-child inheritance relationships. 
The dotted lines with arrows will be explained in section 6.2.3. 
6.2.1 F i lesys tem Objec t s Split 
The base class of much of the filesystem is PersistentMemoryObject. The parent of that class 
is MemoryObject which must remain only in the kernel because it is also the base class of the 
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ProxiableObject 
MemoryRange 
t 
MemoryObject 
I 
PersistentMemoryObject 
Disk 
I 
/ \ 
FileObject 
StoredObject 
MemoryObjectContainer FileStream 
DiskContainer 
Att6386Disk MemoryObjectPartition 
Figure 6.2: Split Class Hierarchy 
virtual memory subsystem and it uses PhysicalHemoryChains. When an instance of any class 
is created in the kernel, the portion of the object belonging to that class and the portions 
belonging to all its parent classes are together in the kernel, so the MemoryRange class which 
is the parent of MemoryObject also remains only in the kernel. 
The classes from PersistentMemoryObject and below are outside of the kernel in the filesys-
tem ring (PersistentMemoryObject is in both rings, that will be explained in section 6.2.2). 
This means that every instance of a subclass of PersistentMemoryObject that is created in the 
filesystem ring is split into two parts, one part in the filesystem ring and one part in the kernel. 
Unfortunately, MemoryRange contains two very basic member variables, the unit size and 
the number of units; together these contain the total size of the MemoryRange. Whenever a 
subclass of PersistentMemoryObject has a need to access those member variables, it must make 
a proxy call to the kernel where the portion of the object that contains those variables exists. 
There is no fundamental reason why the kernel needs to have control over a portion of these 
filesystem objects, it is only necessary because of the use of PhysicalHemoryChains by Mem-
oryObject. It would be better if there were a redesign so that either MemoryObject no longer 
uses PhysicalMemoryChains or so that PersistentMemoryObject no longer has MemoryObject as 
a parent. A major reason why PersistentMemoryObject was designed to be a subclass of Mem-
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oryObject in the first place was so files could be easily made to map into virtual memory; that 
could instead be accomplished by the creation of a special subclass of MemoryObject specifically 
for that purpose that represents a file, and then changing the parent of PersistentMemoryObject 
so that most of the filesystem is not under MemoryObject. 
The point is that the best design of an object-oriented hierarchy in the absence of protection 
boundaries may not be the best design when protection boundaries are introduced. 
6 .2 .2 A C o p i e d C l a s s 
In the original class hierarchy, PersistentMemoryObject was not only the parent of many filesys-
tem classes, it was also the parent of Att6386Disk. Att6386Disk is the class that implements the 
disk driver on the AT&T 6386 PC version of Choices (corresponding classes in other versions 
of Choices are also subclasses of PersistentMemoryObject). The disk driver needs to remain in 
the kernel, so its parent PersistentMemoryObject also needs to be in the kernel. 
One possibility would be to keep PersistentMemoryObject only in the kernel and to proxy 
it like MemoryObject and MemoryRange. PersistentMemoryObject also has some basic member 
variables so this would have the same problem that MemoryRange has: child classes need to make 
proxy calls to access those variables. There is an additional problem in PersistentMemoryObject 
because "inheritance" across protection boundaries in the proxy subsystem is implemented as 
forwarding instead of true delegation. The PersistentMemoryObject::asA() method calls sup-
ports() which is expected to be overloaded by child classes, and if PersistentMemoryObject were 
only in the kernel then asA() would not be able to find the child's supportsQ method. It would 
have been feasible to change the interface to simulate delegation like the example in section 5.7, 
but there is a better solution. 
Instead of leaving PersistentMemoryObject only in the kernel, I chose to copy it so it is also 
in the filesystem ring. When an object that is an instance of a subclass of PersistentMemory-
Object is created in the filesystem ring, the PersistentMemoryObject methods execute there in 
the filesystem ring. On the other hand, when the filesystem ring needs to access a subclass 
of PersistentMemoryObject that is in the kernel, such as the disk driver, the methods of Per-
sistentMemoryObject are accessed through a proxy and execute in the kernel. Note that the 
user of the proxy in this case does not have the benefit of using an alternate header file for 
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the definition of the PersistentMemoryObject class; the same header file is used for both local 
objects and proxies. This has the following implications: 
1. All v i r t u a l methods of the copied class must be proxiable. If there are any virtual 
methods that are not proxiable, the method numbers will not match and methods called 
on the proxy will not be the correct methods. 
2. Non-virtual methods of the copied class, if any, will execute locally even on a proxy. This 
is not a problem if the method does not at tempt to access any local member variables, 
but most methods do. In general there should be no non-virtual methods. 
3. The compiler does not prevent attempted accesses to member variables on the proxy even 
though those variables are not there. Publ ic member variables, if any, are a problem. 
P r i v a t e member variables, which are only accessible by the class itself, are not a problem 
if there are no non-virtual methods. Protec ted member variables, which are allowed to 
be accessed by child classes, are also not a problem (assuming no non-virtual methods on 
the copied class) because child classes are children of the copied class and not of a proxy 
and thus these member variables will be available locally. 
These limitations are a problem in C++ but I think they will not not be a problem in other 
object-oriented languages that have more information about class interfaces available at run 
time; that is, a run-time system that can tell the difference between an instance of the copied 
class and a proxy. However, in C++ it is best to avoid copying classes if practical. 
6.2.3 R e a r r a n g i n g Part of the Hierarchy 
In the original class hierarchy as shown in figure 6.1, the disk driver is made up of not only 
Att6386Disk but also Att6386DiskContainer. The dotted line in the figure is there to indi-
cate that Att6386DiskContainer creates a MemoryObjectPartition. Since the machine-dependent 
Att6386DiskContainer would have to remain in the kernel if I had left the hierarchy as it was, 
I would have also had to leave StoredObject, MemoryObjectContainer, FileObject, and Memory-
ObjectPartition in the kernel as well. 
Instead of leaving all those classes in the kernel, I found a way to rearrange part of the hierar-
chy to avoid it. I isolated the machine-dependent portion of Att6386DiskContainer in a method in 
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Att6386Disk and made a machine-independent DiskContainer class to call that method. To pre-
vent the machine-independent DiskContainer class from having to have knowledge of a machine-
dependent class, I inserted a machine-independent Disk class above Att6386Disk (the Disk class 
was first described in [Kou91]). After DiskContainer calls the method on Disk that is over-
loaded by Att6386Disk to return the machine-dependent information, DiskContainer creates the 
necessary MemoryObjectPartition as indicated by the dotted line in figure 6.2. 
Thus by only slightly changing the design of the hierarchy I was able to move four more 
classes out of the kernel. I expect that a similar technique can be used by other people at-
tempting to introduce protection boundaries into class hierarchies. 
6.3 Minimal Filesystem Remains in the Kernel 
Although I was successful in getting the filesystem to run outside of the kernel, a version of the 
filesystem code still remains in the kernel. Although this filesystem currently shares much of 
the same source code as the one that runs in the intermediate ring, it should be stressed that 
the two filesystem incarnations are independent of each other. The only thing that they share 
is the disk driver. For example, even though the filesystem in the kernel happens to include a 
StoredObject class, in figure 6.2 I only show it in the intermediate ring because the intermediate 
ring filesystem has no interaction with or knowledge of the StoredObject class in the kernel. 
These are the reasons that a filesystem still remains in the kernel: 
1. The paging system requires a non-paged filesystem. When the paging system needs to 
read a page from the disk or write a page to the disk, the code and data that implements 
the disk reads and writes must be locked in memory and not be paged out itself. Currently 
only the kernel is guaranteed to be locked in memory. 
In addition, a complicated filesystem is currently required in the kernel because the paging 
system on the Multimax version of Choices uses one of the main partitions on the disk 
for its backing store along with other files. If the paging system used a separate disk 
partition for backing store, a much simpler filesystem could be used. 
2. The function that loads and runs programs off of the disk is still in the kernel. It would 
be possible for the function to be modified to make an out-call to the intermediate ring 
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filesystem, but it would take some redesign including having the kernel allocate buffers in 
the intermediate ring so the outcall can access the buffers. A better possibility is to move 
the function that loads and runs programs out to the intermediate ring. 
3. The kernel filesystem is currently used to load and run the program for the intermediate 
ring. This requirement could be avoided if the booters/launchers were able to load both 
the kernel and the intermediate ring program at the same time. 
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Chapter 7 
Implementation Details 
This chapter gives implementation details on the proxy subsystem of Choices. It is intended to 
be useful to those who desire to thoroughly understand how the subsystem works and to those 
who desire to modify it. 
Note: all filenames used in this chapter are relative to the top of the Stable.9.23.1991 Choices 
source node. The notation <Machine> indicates the machine name (Att6386, Multimax) and 
<Processor> indicates the processor name (i386, NS32332). Appendix A contains a summary 
of the source files and appendix B contains a summary of the output files. 
7.1 Proxify++ 
Proxify++ is a major component of the Choices proxy subsystem. By examining Choices header 
files, Proxify++ automatically generates new files that are compiled and linked with the Choices 
kernel and with applications. This section describes the Proxify++ tool in detail. 
7.1.1 Usage 
Proxify++ is normally only invoked from the Choices makefiles with a single set of options. See 
section 7.2 for a more complete description of the makefiles. 
Proxify++ accepts options followed by pathnames of files to process. The options are as 
follows: 
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-all - process all files included from the specified file. This is an option that the makefiles 
currently use; the makefiles generate a source file that '#include's all files that are to be 
proxified and passes that file to Proxify++. Without this option, only the single specified 
file is processed. 
It is faster to process all the header files at once than to do each one individually. Also, 
'-all' makes it possible to process only the interesting subset of the Choices header files 
rather than all the Choices header files. The alternate header files that Proxify++ generates 
follow the '^ include ' hierarchy of the original source files. Without '-all ', every header file 
in the entire Choices system must be individually run through Proxify++ to ensure that 
every header file that is included from the interesting subset gets an alternate header file 
generated for it. With '-all', Proxify++ generates alternate header files for the interesting 
subset and all files they include so the rest of the Choices header files can be ignored. 
If the '-all' option is on, proxy tables and alternate header files are generated for every 
included file no matter how deep the level of include nesting. Method stubs and construc-
tor stubs, on the other hand, are only generated for files directly included by the specified 
file. 
- tableonly - only generate proxy tables and not the other three outputs. This is currently not 
used but is necessary for use on some header files when '-all' is not used. 
-vers ion - include a call to the REQUIREDVERSIONQ macro in every alternate header file 
generated. This is used from the current makefiles to implement per-class version checking 
(see section 7.9). 
-hhost - run the 'proxify' executable on a different host. This is used on the Multimaxes so 'cpp' 
runs locally where it has access to Multimax /usr/include source files and so the 'proxify' 
executable runs on a Sun-4 machine. The g++ compiler cannot correctly compile 'proxify' 
on the Multimax, and the Sun-4 machines are significantly faster than Multimaxes. 
cpp opt ions - all remaining options are passed to the C-pre-processor. Most useful options 
are -I, -D, and -U. 
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7.1 .2 O u t p u t F i l e s 
Proxify++ generates four kinds of files. These files are moved around by the makefiles, so users 
generally are not exposed to the original output file names; for convenience, both the original 
name and the name that the makefiles currently rename the files to are listed here. The filenames 
referred to in this subsection are relative to the directory that Proxify++ is run in; currently 
Proxify++ is run in the Configure/System/<Machine> and Applications/LoadableExample/-
<Machine> directories. 
The names of the files that Proxify++ generates have the prefix of the source file that is 
being processed. The example prefix I will use here is 'Proxylncludes', the file prefix currently 
used in the makefiles. 
These are the four files that Proxify++ generates: 
' P r o x y I n c l u d e s T . e e ' - proxy table file. When the '-all' option is off, this file goes in the 
subdirectory 'T ' . The makefiles rename this to "PROXYTABLES.ee". This file contains 
tables describing every method marked with the keyword p rox i ab l e in the source header 
file. If the '-all' option is on, tables also are generated for all files the source header file 
includes no matter how deep the include nesting level. The structures that are filled in 
are defined in Includes/Common/ProxyTable.h. 
Proxify++ knows that at the top of the object hierarchy there are classes called Object 
and ProxiableObject, and it only generates proxy information for these classes and for 
subclasses of ProxiableObject. If the names of these base classes are ever changed, sim-
ply change the initialization of the variables "subBaseClassName" and "baseClassName" 
respectively in proxify.ee. 
ProxyCallAssist() uses the proxy tables when a proxy call occurs. The tables contain 
per-class information and per-method information. The per-class ProxyTable structure 
contains the following elements: 
cha r * t ab l eC la s s - the name of the class this table belongs to. 
c h a r i s P r o x i a b l e - a bit that indicates whether the class definition itself is marked with 
the p rox i ab l e keyword. This is used to determine whether a method parameter of 
this type will accept a subclass of this type that is defined outside of the protection 
ring of the method. For more details, see section 7.6.1. 
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int n u m M e t h o d s - the number of proxiable methods in this class. 
M e t h o d T a b l e E n t r y ** m e t h o d s - a pointer to the per-method information, 
int n u m C o n s t r u c t o r s - the number of proxiable constructors in this class. 
M e t h o d T a b l e E n t r y ** c o n s t r u c t o r s - a pointer to the per-constructor information. 
The per-method MethodTableEntry structure contains the following elements: 
cha r * r e t u r n C l a s s - the name of the return type of this method, if the modifier of the 
return type is a supported type. 
c h a r r e t u r n M o d i f l e r - the modifier of the return type. The only supported modifiers 
are '*', '&', and "Ref". Ref is a suffix on the class name and the others are normal 
language modifiers for pointers. Ref is indicated in this table by an 'R ' character 
and '*' and '&' are represented by themselves. 
int r e a l M e t h o d N u m b e r - the method number of the method in the proxied class. 
Since not all v i r t u a l methods are proxiable, the method numbers that the user of 
a proxied class sees are likely to be different than the method number on the real 
class; this element provides for the translation. 
int n u m P a r a m s - the number of parameters for this method. 
c h a r ** p a r a m C l a s s e s - the types of pointer parameters. If a parameter is not a 
pointer, the entry for that parameter is null. A parameter is a pointer if it has 
a single '*' or '&' modifier; Stars, Refs, and multiple '*'s or '&'s are not supported 
for parameters on proxiable methods. 
h e a d e r file(s) - alternate header file(s). The alternate header files go into the 'H ' subdirectory 
and are the same name as the original. If the '-all' option is on, all header files directly and 
indirectly included from the source file as indicated by the '# l ine ' or ' # N ' directives in the 
output from the C-pre-processor have alternate header files generated for them; if '-all' is 
off, only a header file for the given source is generated. The makefiles move the alternate 
header files out of the 'H ' subdirectory to the $(TOP)/Includes/$(MODULENAME)/-
$(MACHINE) directory (for an example see MODULENAME = System and MACHINE 
= AU6386). 
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The alternate header files contain the class definitions that are in the source files but 
with only the proxiable methods left in. Data definitions and non-proxiable methods 
are removed. Other things that are left in are "^include", "extern", "enum", "typedef", 
and "const" statments. If "class", "struct", and "union" statements have no proxiable 
methods in them, they are simply declared to exist but their contents are not copied. 
'ProxyIncludesC.ee ' - constructor stub file. If the '-all' option is not on, this file goes in the 
subdirectory ' C . The makefiles rename this file to "CONSTRUCTORS.ee". There is an 
empty constructor stub in this file for each proxiable constructor. If the '-all' option is 
on, constructor stubs are generated for each file directly included in the first level file; if 
the '-all' option is off, constructor stubs are generated for only the first level file itself. 
This file is not used directly, but it is compiled to determine the long C++ name for the 
constructors. 
'ProxyIncludesS.ee' - method stub file. If the '-all' option is not on, this file goes in the sub-
directory 'S'. The makefiles rename this file to "$(MODULENAME)STUBS.cc". There 
is a method stub in this file for each proxiable method. If the '-all' option is on, method 
stubs are generated for each file directly included in the first level file; if the '-all' option 
is off, method stubs are generated for only the first level file itself. These stubs are linked 
with applications. Each stub simply invokes the method by the same name as itself using 
the "_real" member variable. The stubs are not used for normal proxy calls, they are only 
used when applications allocate their own space for a proxy instead of doing a new to 
create them, and when applications create subclasses that "inherit" from a proxied class. 
For more details see section 7.3.2. 
7.1.3 Source Files 
The source for Proxify++ is in the Tools/Proxify++ directory. Proxify++ itself is a shell script 
that runs the C-pre-processor, does a little more filtering, and runs the 'proxify' executable. 
The extra filtering that it does is to remove lines that begin with the keywords operator and 
asm (possibly preceded by whitespace) because 'proxify' does not understand those. 
The 'proxify' executable is made up of parts from several different sources. The 'parser.y' 
file is based on the public domain YACC grammar for C++ by Jim Roskind (jar@ileaf.com). 
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The 'lexer.l' file is derived from a lexer by Tony Sanders (sanders@sanders.austin.ibm.com). 
Those were taken by Andrew Grimshaw (grimshaw@cs.virginia.edu) and Ed Loyot (ecl2v@-
virginia.edu) of the University of Virginia to make a compiler for a language called MPL that is 
a superset of C++. The front end of that compiler has the ability to generate a parse tree for the 
entire language and to print the source code from the parse tree. I took that portion, slightly 
modified some of it and fixed some bugs, and added the file 'proxify.cc' to process the parse 
tree. Pieces that were added to the program to support Proxify++ have "#ifdef PROXIFY" 
around them so if that define is turned off, it should revert to printing out the source code in 
its entirety. 
This is a short description of each file in the Tools/Proxify++ directory: 
P r o x i f y + + - s h - Source for the Proxify++ shell script. 
c o m m o n . h - A header file included in all the source files. Contains general definitions. 
dec la ra t ions . ee - Contains functions used to declare identifiers. 
e r r o r . e e - Contains functions for error handling. 
lexer . l - Contains rules for FLEX to lexically analyze source files and feed them to the parser. 
m a i n . e e - Contains the mainQ function which drives the different phases. 
p a r s e r . y - Contains the YACC grammar and actions to build the parse tree. 
p r i n t . e e - Contains the methods that print the nodes of the parse tree. The classes that these 
methods are a part of are defined in "syntaxjree.h". 
proxify.cc - Contains most of the portions of the program that are unique to Proxify++. In 
addition to initialization and support functions, it contains proxify() methods on parse 
tree nodes corresponding to the print() methods in the file "print.ee". 
symbol_ tab le .ee - Contains methods that implement the symbol table. 
symbol_ tab le .h - Contains class definitions for the symbol table. 
syn tax_ t ree .ee - Contains methods for the classes that define the nodes of the parse tree, 
except for the printQ and proxifyQ methods, and the type processing methods. 
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syntax_tree.h - Contains the definitions for the nodes of the parse tree. 
tokens.h - Defines extra tokens not directly used by the parser. 
types.cc - Contains functions and methods for type processing. Classes for these functions are 
also defined in "syntax.tree.h". 
7.1.4 Debugg ing 
Here are some hints for debugging Proxify++. The first thing to do is to make a simple source 
file and keep taking things out until you have narrowed it down to the piece that Proxify++ is 
having trouble with. If you ran Proxify++ from the makefiles and had a problem, you can begin 
from the preprocessed source that Proxify++ will have left in your Configure directory. 
After you have got it down to the essential piece, take the following steps: 
1. Log in to a Sparcstation, either from a console or through rlogin. 
2. Go to Configure/Tools/Proxify++/sparc in your node. 
3. Put your small test file there, for example 't.cc'. 
4. Make sure that the test file compiles with g++. The error handling of Proxify++ is worse 
than with g++ so this is necessary to ensure a syntactically correct source file before giving 
it to Proxify++. 
5. Run 'proxify' on it. Proxify is the executable that Proxify++ (a shell script) calls after 
running cpp; you can skip cpp and go straight to proxify. By default proxify generates 
four files and they are put in the four subdirectories C, H, S, and T. proxify requires a 
parameter for the prefix to use for those output files and then it reads from standard 
input, so you can use 'proxify t <t.cc' and it will make files with the prefix ' t ' in those 
subdirectories. 
6. You can debug using gdb. Another helpful thing is to set the 'YYDEBUG' environment 
variable. Meaningful values are: 
2 - print only symbols found and proxify phase debugging messages. This is useful when 
the problem is in the proxify phase. 
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3,4 - also print yacc state reduction debugging messages. I have not found this to be 
very useful. 
5 or higher - instead of state reductions, print out parse trees in a tree format during 
parsing. This is extremely useful when the problem is in the parse phase. 
In order for all the debugging to work this way, Proxify++ should be compiled with all 
the debugging options on. The options are -DDEBUGJLEXER, -DDEBUGJPARSER, 
-DDEBUG_PRINT, -DDEBUG_PROXTFY, and -DYYDEBUG. 
7.2 Proxify Makefiles 
Makefiles perform an important role in the proxify process. The makefile for each load module 
that needs to have Proxify++ run for it must include Configure/System/ProxifyCommon.mk. 
That common makefile takes care of running Proxify++ and it takes care of compiling files to 
be linked with both the load module and with applications that need to make proxy calls into 
the load module. 
To avoid unnecessary recompilations, ProxifyCommon.mk often keeps two copies of files that 
it generates. The copy is usually prefixed with "New" or "NEW". After ProxifyCommon.mk 
generates a "New" file, it compares the generated file with the previous non-New file to see 
whether anything has changed, and only updates the non-New file if they are different. Depen-
dencies are based on the modification times of the non-New files, so recompilation is not done 
if the newly generated files are the same as the old ones. 
7.2.1 ProxifyCommon.mk Inputs 
ProxifyCommon.mk expects the following make variables to be set: 
MODULENAME - The load module name. In Stable.9.23.1991 this is "System" for the 
kernel that is made in Configure/System/<Machine> or "Example" for the example 
loadable module that is made in Configure/Applications/LoadableExample/<Machine>. 
PROXYINCLUDES - A list of the names of all header files that are to be proxified and 
have all four outputs of Proxify++ generated for them: proxy table, alternate header file, 
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method stubs, and constructor stubs. Each of the header files in this list becomes a 
"^include" statement in ProxyIncludes.ee. 
ALLINCLUDES - A list of header files for which alternate header files should be kept if one is 
generated. Proxify++ generates alternate header files for all header files listed in $(PROX-
YINCLUDES) and all files that they include and all that they include, and so on. Only 
those listed in S(ALLINCLUDES), however, are saved in Includes/$(MODULENAME)/-
$(MACHINE). Each of the header files in this becomes a "^include" statement in Allln-
cludes.ee. 
TABLEONLYPROXYINCLUDES - A list of the names of header files that are to only 
have the proxy table output of Proxify++ generated. Examples of such header files are 
those that are define classes that are compiled for the kernel and all applications such 
as Object.h and ProxiableObject.h. Generation of only proxy tables is implemented in 
the makefile by only indirectly including these files into ProxyIncludes.ee; each of the 
files in this list turns into a "^include" statement in TableOnlyProxyIncludes.ee which 
itself is "#include"d by ProxyIncludes.ee. With the '-all' option on Proxify++ turned on, 
this prevents Proxify++ from generating the method stubs and constructor stubs for these 
files. Also, by not including the files from $(TABLEONLYPROXYINCLUDES) in the 
S(ALLINCLUDES) list, the alternate header files that Proxify++ generates for these are 
not kept. 
STARSOURCES - This is the list of "Star" files. These files are compiled once per machine 
type and loaded into the lib$(MODULENAME).a library in the current directory so they 
can be used by applications in addition to being linked in with the load module. 
TOP - A relative pathname to the top of the source node. This defaults to "../../.." in 
Configure/ChoicesCommon.mk and is redefined by other common makefiles to "../../../.." 
when directory nesting is four levels deep. 
MACHINE - The machine name, for example 'Att6386' or 'Multimax'. Defined in Configure/-
<Machine> Common.mk. 
PROCESSOR - The processor name, for example 'i386' or 'NS32332'. Defined in Configure/-
<Machine>Common.mk. 
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STANDARDHVPATH - Standard include directories that are included for both the kernel 
and applications. This is set in Configure/ChoicesCommon.mk. This variable is used to 
compile some files for use in the application library lib$(MODULENAME).a. 
COMMONHVPATH - This is only used if $(MODULENAME) is not "System". These 
are more include directories to use when compiling files for the library. This is set in 
Configure/Applications/ApplicationsCommon.mk. 
PROXIFY - Path name to Proxify++. Defined in Configure/<Machine>Common.mk. 
C + + - Path name to the C++ compiler. Defined in Configure/ <Machine>Common.mk. 
CONSTCOLLECT - Path name to a program that can collect the long symbol names used 
by the C++ compiler for constructor names. Source for this program is in Tools/Misc/-
Constcollect.sh. That program requires the "NM" environment variable to be set with the 
pathname of the 'nm' program that goes along with the compiler. Defined in Configure/-
<Machine> Common.mk. 
CPPFLAGS - Flags to pass to the C++ compiler, including "-I" flags which point to include 
directories. These flags are passed to Proxify++ so it can find all the include files. Defined 
in Configure/<Machine> Common.mk. 
COPTS - Options passed to the C++ compiler when compiling files for the application library. 
Defined in Configure/<Machine> Common.mk. 
MV - Path name for the mv command. Defined in Configure/ <Machme> Common.mk. 
RM - Path name for the rm command. Defined in Configure/ <Machine> Common.mk. 
7.2.2 ProxifyCommon.mk Outputs 
A makefile that uses ProxifyCommon.mk should include all files in the $(PROXTFD5DSOUR-
CES) variable in the load module that it builds. Also, it should make lib$(MODULENAME).a 
by default in addition to its load module. 
See appendix B for details about output files that ProxifyCommon.mk creates. 
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7.3 Control Flows 
This section covers the flow of control of the proxy subsystem of Choices during run-time 
operation. 
7 .3 .1 C o n t r o l F l o w of M e t h o d C a l l s 
Assume that an application already has a valid ObjectProxy (section 7.3.5 covers how an 
application gets its first ObjectProxy). For example, every application has a proxy to its 
NameServer; a pointer to that ObjectProxy is in the StandardNameServer variable. In this 
section I will follow an example call to the lookup() method on the NameServer class. There are 
two lookup() methods in that class with different parameter types; I will follow the one that 
takes a pointer to a Class as the second parameter. 
The class definition that the compiler uses to make the method call is not from the original 
"NameServer.h" that is in the kernel, it is from the alternate header file that is generated 
by Proxify++. In this case the compiler generates a call to virtual method number 19. The 
compiler looks up the 19th method in the virtual function table of the ObjectProxy class. The 
virtual function table for the ObjectProxy class is in the kernel but it is in a region of memory 
that is readable by all applications; this virtual function table is generated by the compiler 
from Kernel/ObjectProxyVtable.cc which is loaded into the application-readable region. The 
call then proceeds to method number 19 of ObjectProxy which is in ProcessorDependent/-
<Processor>/ObjectProxyStubs.s. The stubs in that file are also in the application-readable 
section of the kernel. 
The stub function traps to the kernel trap handler in ProcessorDependent/<Processor>/-
<Processor>ContextSwitching.s and passes method number 19 in along with the original pa-
rameters to the method. The trap causes a switch to the kernel stack for the current pro-
cess and a switch to kernel mode. The trap handler reserves space on the kernel stack for 
ProxyReturnFlags and for copied parameters before calling the ProxyCallAssist() function in 
Kernel/ObjectProxyKernel.cc. 
ProxyCallAssistQ does the following primary operations for this call: 
1. validates the this pointer that was passed in to the method call. This validation verifies 
that the this pointer refers to a valid ObjectProxy for the Domain of the caller, and it is 
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necessary to ensure that the caller has the right to call methods on the proxied object. 
The validation is done by the is Valid Proxy() method on the ObjectProxyManager class in 
Includes/ Ob jectProxyManager.h. 
For some compilers the this pointer may be the second parameter instead of the first; for 
a discussion see section 7.4. 
2. determines the type of the call; that is, whether the call is an incall, an outcall, a crosscall, 
or a samecall. Only incalls and outcalls are supported, but the other kinds may be 
attempted and they need to be identified to give reasonable error messages. The example 
call to NameServer::lookup() is an incall. 
3. obtains a reference to the ProxyTableCopy for the class of the proxied object. The 
ProxyTableCopy is a verified and slightly modified copy of the original ProxyTable 
that Proxify++ generated, in this case the NameServerProxy Table (for reasons for the 
copy, see section 7.3.4.6). A reference to the proper ProxyTableCopy is included in the 
ObjectProxy when the ObjectProxy is allocated. 
4. verifies that the method number being called is valid for this class. There are 22 methods 
on the NameServer class, so method number 19 is valid. 
5. obtains a reference to the HethodTableEntryCopy for the method. This is done by looking 
up the 19th element in the proxy table. 
6. determines whether this method is a method that applies to the ObjectProxy itself rather 
than the proxied object. The four methods that apply to the ObjectProxy are those that 
are related to reference counting; see section 7.5.1 for more details. The lookupQ method 
is not one of those special methods so ProxyCallAssist() continues. 
7. looks up the real method in the virtual function table of the proxied object. 
8. sets the this pointer for the real method to be a pointer to the real object. 
9. verifies that the address for the return Ref is in a ring that is writable by the caller. 
lookupQ returns a ProxiableObjectRef , which is a structure, not a simple value. The 
compiler allocates space for that return structure in the caller, not the callee, and passes 
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a pointer to that structure in on the call. The called method will write into that structure 
on its return. Since the called method will be running in the kernel ring and thus has the 
privilege to write anywhere in memory, ProxyCallAssist() here ensures that the caller does 
not pass in a pointer to memory that the caller does not have the privilege to write into. 
The ring of the address is determined by calling the lookupRingQ method on the Kernel 
class which is defined in Kernel/Kernel.cc. 
10. goes through each parameter, copying and translating where necessary. The Hethod-
TableEntryCopy has the information about the number and types of each parameter. 
In my example, the first parameter is a "char *" and the second parameter is a "Class 
*". If any parameters were not pointers or were pointers that had a value of zero, they 
would just get copied to be ready for the call to the real method. Since these are both 
pointers and since this is an in-call, the function ProxylnCallParamAssist() is called for 
each parameter. For more details see section 7.6.1; in summary, the first parameter is 
range-checked to ensure it is in the caller's ring and the second parameter has the proxy 
to the Class object in the kernel stripped off. 
11. sets up the ProxyReturnFlags for use by ProxyReturnAssist() after the method has re-
turned. Values of variables that are needed at that time are stashed away in the Proxy-
ReturnFlags which is in space on the stack that was reserved by the proxy trap handler. 
12. returns to the proxy trap handler. 
The proxy trap handler then calls the real method that was returned by ProxyCallAssist() as 
an element of the ProxyReturnFlags. When the method returns, control once again returns to 
the proxy trap handler. At that point the proxy trap handler calls Proxy Return Assist(). Since 
NameServer::lookup() returns a ProxiableObjectRef, the pointer to the object was written out 
to the first word of the Ref structure; the proxy trap handler reads it out of there and passes 
it to Proxy Return Assist(). 
The return values from an in-call need the exact same treatment as parameters passed in 
to an out-call. For that reason, ProxyReturnAssist() calls ProxyOutCallParamAssistQ (covered 
in section 7.6.2) which allocates a new ObjectProxy for the returned object for the caller's 
Domain. 
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From there control returns to the proxy trap handler which writes the pointer to the 
ObjectProxy back out to the Ref and returns from kernel mode back to the calling stub. 
Finally, the calling stub returns back to the original caller. 
7.3.2 Cont ro l Flow of C o n s t r u c t o r Calls 
This section follows the flow of control of a call to the constructor of an ObjectProxy. For this 
example I will follow a "new Semaphore" from within an application. 
The first thing that is called is a stub defined in Libraries/SystemInterface/<Processor>/-
Constructors.s. That file creates a definition for the macro "CONSTRUCTQ" and then includes 
"CONSTRUCTORS.h". "CONSTRUCTORS.h" is a file generated by Proxify++ that is series 
of calls to the "CONSTRUCTQ" macro, one for each constructor that was marked with the 
proxiable keyword. The parameters to the macro include the long C++ symbol name and a 
unique string for the constructor; for the example, those are "_9Semaphoreii" (for g++, different 
on cfront) and "SemaphoreConstructorO". The "CONSTRUCTQ" macro uses the long symbol 
name as the symbol to identify the stub; that is the function that the compiler generates a call 
to when "new Semaphore" is used. 
The stub calls the ConstructProxyQ stub which is located in the application-readable section 
of the kernel in ProcessorDependent/<Processor>/ObjectProxyStubs.s, passing in the unique 
string identifier of the constructor along with the original parameters that the caller passed to 
new. ConstructProxy() traps to the kernel exactly like the other stubs in the same file, but with 
a method number of " - 1 " . 
Control flow then continues like normal proxiable method calls. ProxyCallAssistQ detects 
the " - 1 " method number and calls Proxy Construct Assist () which is also in Kernel/Object-
ProxyKernel.ee. Proxy Construct AssistQ looks up the string "SemaphoreConstructorO" in the 
NameServer for the calling process, and retrieves a ConstructorDescriptor. The Construc-
torDescriptor contains pointers to the real constructor, the Domain of the real construc-
tor, and the HethodTableEntryCopy that describes the function; it is denned in Includes/-
ConstructorDescriptor.h. ProxyConstructAssistQ then returns that information to ProxyCallAs-
sist() which continues like a normal method call. 
The ConstructorDescriptor was installed into the NameServer by use of a Constructor-
I n s t a l l e r as defined in Includes/Common/Constructorlnstaller.h. That file defines a "CON-
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STRUCTQ" macro that creates a Const ructor lns ta l ler that is initialized with a static con-
structor. The makefiles generate a small file in Configure/System/<Machine>/CONSTRUCT-
ORINSTALLERS.ee that includes the two files "Constructorlnstaller.h" and "CONSTRUC-
TORS.h" (which contains the invocations of the "CONSTRUCTQ" macro). The static con-
structor of the Const ructor lns ta l ler installs the Const ructor lns ta l ler object into a linked 
list. Later, the initialization of the kernel calls Constructorlnstaller::install() to create the Con-
structorDescriptor objects and install them in the NameServer. 
After Proxy Call AssistQ processes the parameters to the constructor like a normal proxied 
method call, it returns to the trap handler which calls the constructor. After the constructor 
finishes, it returns to the trap handler which then returns to user mode in the stub in Object-
ProxyStubs.s. That stub then returns to the constructor stub in Constructors.s. Instead of re-
turning directly to the invoker of new, however, the constructor stub calls _PostConstructProxy() 
in Libraries/Systemlnterface/Portable/Jltart.cc. That function does not do anything if the con-
structor was called with new, that is, if the original this pointer was zero (requires the use of 
the '-fthis-is-variable' option on g++). However, if the constructor was called because the user 
defined a subclass of "Semaphore" or because the space was preallocated by the user declaring a 
variable such as "Semaphore mySem" rather than doing a new on it, then _PostConstructProxy() 
saves a pointer to the just-created ObjectProxy in the "jreal" member variable in the preal-
located object. Later if any methods are called on that object, the method stubs that were 
automatically generated by Proxify++ in Configure/System/<Machine>/SystemSTUBS.cc use 
the ".real" variable to call the method on the proxy. 
Before setting "jreal", _PostConstructProxy() does some initialization on the object that 
would have been done by a constructor had the constructor been generated by the compiler. 
Namely, it calls the constructor for ProxiableObject and sets the vtable pointer to the class 
of the created object. This assumes that there are no other parent constructors that need to 
be called except for the ProxiableObject constructor (the ProxiableObject constructor calls the 
Object constructor), which is usually a valid assumption because class definitions in the alternate 
header files contain no member variables. It is possible for class definitions in alternate header 
files to inherit from classes other than ProxiableObject and other alternate class definitions, 
however, and if those classes have constructors then this implementation could be a problem 
because those constructors will not be called. 
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7.3.3 Calls to Non-Kernel rings 
So far my examples have only shown incalls into the kernel. Incalls to rings other than the 
kernel and outcalls from the kernel take a couple detours from the control flow of incalls to the 
kernel. 
For every proxy call initiated from rings other than the kernel, ProxyCallAssist() calls 
PROCESSOR_CONTEXT::saveL)serStack() which is defined in Includes/ProcessorDependent/-
<Processor>/<Processor>Context.h. On the i386 processor, this simply saves the value of the 
user stack pointer in the context object; on the NS32332 processor, this does nothing because 
there is a processor register that always contains the most recent value of the user stack pointer. 
All rings outside of the kernel are implemented using user mode on the processors, so the same 
stack pointer register is used for all those rings. 
For proxy calls to rings other than the kernel, ProxyCallAssistQ calls PROCESSOR_CON-
TEXT::setNewRing() which is defined in ProcessorDependent/<Processor>/<Processor>Con-
text.cc. This method has two main purposes: 
1. to switch the user stack. The first time that a process makes a call to a ring, setNewRingQ 
allocates a stack for that ring for the process. The process cannot continue to use the user 
stack in the outermost ring because of a potential protection violation due to multiple 
processes: a different process executing in the outermost ring would be able to corrupt 
the stack of the process which is executing in a more privileged ring. 
SetNewRingQ uses a portion of the kernel stack, the part that is used for copied ar-
guments on calls to the kernel, to save state information about the call. The state 
information is saved in the form of a UserProxyStack structure which is defined in 
<Processor>Context.h. SetNewRingQ saves the previous user stack pointer for the call-
ing ring in the UserProxyStack and saves the current user stack pointer for the calling 
ring in the context where later proxy calls can find it. It also sets up a portion of the 
UserProxyStack to prepare for switching to user mode at the address of the proxied 
function in the called ring, and ensures that a return from the proxied function will trap 
back to the kernel. 
2. to change the range of addresses that user mode can access. Each inner ring is allowed 
to access further-out rings but not further-in rings. On the i386 processor, this is accom-
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plished by simply changing segments which were initialized by i386CPU::setRingRange in 
ProcessorDependent/i386/i386CPU.cc. On the NS32332 (or if "MULTIRINGTRANS-
LATION" is enabled on the i386), this is done by changing page tables. The TwoLevel-, 
PageTable Translation maintains separate top-level page tables for each ring outside of 
the kernel for every domain. The portions of that class in Kernel/TwoLevelPageTable.cc 
that implement this behavior are separated by "#ifdef MULTDHNGTRANSLATION". 
In addition, the <Machine>MMU::basicActivateQ method in ProcessorDependent/<Pro-
cessor>/<Processor>MMU.cc is given a pointer to the context of the process being acti-
vated so it can ask the TwoLevelPageTable for the page table of the currently active ring 
number. 
Also, for proxy calls to rings other than the kernel, ProxyCallAssistQ calls Process::setCurrent-
Domain to set the non-kernel Domain that the process is running in. This is used on subsequent 
proxy calls to determine the calling Domain. 
When ProxyCallAssistQ returns to the trap handler, the handler additionally saves the pro-
cessor registers that the compiler assumes do not change (that is, non-volatile). If the called 
method only uses compiled code, that assumption will likely be true. However, the user-mode 
code could use assembly code or some other compiler that could modify the value of those 
registers and could be a privilege violation. After saving those registers, the proxy trap handler 
switches to user mode at the address of the proxied method. 
The return address of the proxied method on the user-mode stack is set to be _Proxy-
ReturnCallQ which is in ObjectProxyStubs.s. This traps back to the kernel to the return assist 
trap handler in <Machine>ContextSwitching.s. That trap handler restores the compiler non-
volatile registers and calls ProxyReturnAssistQ. In addition to doing the things that it does 
on proxy calls to the kernel, ProxyReturnAssistQ calls PROCESSOR_CONTEXT::restoreRing() in 
<Processor>Context.cc. This restores state from the UserProxyStack and restores the range of 
addresses that user mode can access. ProxyReturnAssistQ also calls Process::setCurrentDomain() 
to restore the non-kernel Domain to the previous one. 
7.3.4 Ini t ia l izat ion of t h e P r o x y Sys tem 
This subsection covers the portions of kernel initialization that are related to the proxy system 
and protection rings. 
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7.3.4.1 APPLICATIONRING 
The static constant APPLICATIONRING which is defined in Includes/MachineDependent/-
<Machine>/<Machine>CPUConfiguration.h determines the number of rings defined in the 
system. The APPLICATIONRING is the protection ring of top level applications. Ring 0 is the 
kernel, and rings 1 through APPLICATIONRING-1 are the intermediate rings. If no intermediate 
rings are desired, APPLICATIONRING should be set to 1. 
7.3.4.2 basicInitializeQ 
The <Machine>Kernel::basiclnitialize() method sets several variables in the parent Kernel class 
which define the beginning and length of each ring. All intermediate rings are assumed to be of 
the same size and adjacent to each other in the memory map. See the comments at the beginning 
of MachineDependent/<Machine>/<Machine>Kernel.cc for more specific limitations. 
7.3.4.3 jringAddresses array 
The Kernel::initialize() method in Kernel/KerneLcc takes the variables defined by basicInitializeQ 
and calculates the start and end of each ring and saves them in the Kernel::_ringAddresses array. 
It then invokes the <Processor>CPU::setRingRangeQ method to send the same information to 
the processor-dependent CPU class (used to initialize segments on the 80386 processor). After 
that, Kernel::initialize() builds a list of VirtualHemoryRange objects from the same information 
plus any other PhysicalHemoryRange objects that basicInitializeQ may have passed back, and 
it passes the list to ADDRESS.TRANSLATIONriinitQ1. 
7.3.4.4 Translation initialization 
Both the Att6386 and Multimax ports use the TwoLevelPageTable class for their translation. 
That was discussed in section 7.3.3. 
1
 Perhaps the jcingAddress array should be part of a separate object instead of being part of Kernel. Also, 
there is probably another way to get the ring information to the 80386 processor so the CPU would not have to 
get involved. 
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7.3.4.5 Kernel MemoryObjects 
Later in Kernel::initialize(), HemoryObjects are allocated to represent each portion of virtual 
address space in the kernel. These HemoryObjects are then added to the kernel Domain. Fig-
ure 7.1 shows the layout of the memory that these memory objects represent in the kernel 
ring. 
topSoFar —*-
kernelReadOnlyEnd —*-
kernelReadOnlyStart —*-
_kernelStart —*-
Figure 7.1: Kernel Ring Memory Map 
The ReadOnlyMemoryObject covers the range of kernel text that is readable by all applica-
tions for use by the proxy mechanism. It is delimited by the variables KernelReadOnlyStart and 
KernelReadOnlyEnd. The LowMemoryObject covers kernel text below KernelReadOnlyStart. The 
allocatedMemoryObject covers all kernel text, data, and bss after that, as well as all memory 
allocated in the early initialization before virtual memory is enabled, up through the variable 
"topSoFar". After that is the unallocatedMemoryObject; this maps all remaining physical mem-
ory 1-to-l into kernel virtual memory space so all physical memory can be easily accessed by 
the page fault handlers before pages are mapped into their ultimate virtual addresses. The 
unallocatedMemoryObject can be taken out when the virtual memory handler is changed to 
only read from and write into pages that are mapped in. The pages represented by the unallo-
catedMemoryObject are marked as not "preAllocated" by the PhysicallyResidentMemoryObject 
constructor so they can still be allocated by the heap manager. 
HeapMemoryObject 
unallocatedMemoryObject 
allocatedMemoryObject 
ReadOnlyMemoryObject 
LowMemoryObject 
-*— VMh 
\ i l r-i 
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After that is the HeapMemoryObject. This represents all the remaining virtual mem-
ory in the kernel. It is not mapped 1-to-l; it allocates extra virtual address space when 
needed. The HeapMemoryObject is not a Physical lyResidentHemoryObject like the others; 
it is a RootHemoryObject. The source for both of those types of objects is in Memory/-
DummyMemoryObject.ee 
The figure does not show the machine-dependent areas that are also mapped 1-to-l. More 
Physical lyResidentHemoryObjects are allocated for them and added to the kernel Domain. 
Currently there is only one allocated for the Multimax for the memory-mapped I /O area, and 
none on the Att6386. 
7.3.4.6 P r o x y T a b l e l n s t a l l e r 
After VM is enabled, the first process continues at Kernel::mainQ which calls ProxyTablelnstall-
er::install() in Common/ProxyTable.cc. That method goes through the list of ProxyTables that 
was created by the static constructors of the ProxyTablelnstallers instantiated in PROXYTA-
BLES.cc. For each ProxyTable in the list, the method creates a ProxyTableCopy, source code 
in Kernel/ProxyTableCopy.cc. 
Each ProxyTableCopy is essentially the same as the corresponding ProxyTable. The only 
difference is that character string names of classes are replaced by pointers to Class objects 
after the string names are looked up in the NameServer. That is not the reason the copies exist, 
however; those transformations could have been done in place and in fact were in an earlier 
implementation. The reason the copies exist is that ProxyTables can be outside of the kernel, 
and the copies are all within the kernel. The copies are always easily accessible to the kernel 
whereas the originals may not be. More importantly, the copies are guaranteed by the kernel to 
be internally consistent; the kernel cannot trust a further-out ring to not modify the originals 
after they had been verified and the kernel would otherwise have to do many consistency checks 
on every proxy call into a further-out ring. 
7.3.4.7 C o n s t r u c t o r l n s t a l l e r 
The next method that Kemel::main() calls is Constructorlnstaller::install(). See section 7.3.2 for 
information about initialization of constructors. 
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7.3.4.8 Versionlnstal ler 
The version checking subsystem is not strictly part of the proxy subsystem but it is related. 
Kernel::main() initializes the version checking subsystem at this point. See section 7.9 for more 
information. 
7.3.4.0 Defaul tDomains 
Kernel::main() also creates the default Domain objects for each ring from ring one trough 
APPLICATIONRING-1. The Domain for the kernel (ring zero) is created at the time the 
Kernel object was created because it is contained in the definition of the Kernel class. These 
Domains are arranged in a hierarchy of rings, and they are used as the default parents for the 
Kernel::buildProcessFromObjectFile() method. I provided default Domains because I expect that 
in most cases there will be only one Domain in each ring below APPLICATIONRING. 
The default domains are saved in a global array called DefaultDomains. There is also a 
global array called DefaultDomainCleaners: this is used to prevent the cleaning up of the default 
domains until system shut down. Normally, the DomainCleaner class is used to clean up a 
Domain (in particular, to free all the proxies allocated for the Domain) when the last process 
in the Domain dies, but I want the default Domains to remain until the system is shut down. 
DomainCleaner is defined in Memory/Domain.cc and is simply an extra reference count for 
the cleaning up of the proxies in each Domain as opposed to the destruction of the Domain 
object. Keeping an extra reference to the default cleaners in DefaultDomainCleaners prevents 
the cleanup of the default Domains from occurring until the system is shut down. 
7.3.4.10 D o m a i n 
The constructor of Domain does important initialization for the proxy system. Source code is 
in Memory/Domain.cc. The constructor creates one each of these for every Domain: 
1. A NameServer. 
2. A HemoryObject for the allocation of ObjectProxies. The Domain constructor makes 
this HemoryObject read-only for user mode and installs it in the Domain. 
3. An ObjectProxyHanager. 
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7.3.4.11 N a m e S e r v e r 
The NaraeServers in Kernel/NameServer.cc maintain a mapping of strings to P r o x i a b l e -
Objects . There is one NameServer for each Domain; the hierarchy of NameServers follows 
the hierarchy of Domains. The primary purpose for NameServers is to allow applications to 
obtain proxies to objects across protection boundaries. Applications are allowed to look up 
objects in their NameServer- which returns pointers to those objects; the proxy system then 
automatically allocates proxies for those objects so the applications can invoke methods on the 
objects. 
An application may b i n d Q objects only into its own NameServer, not a NameServer of any 
of its parent Domains. On the other hand, if a name is not found in a NameServer, the parent 
NameServer is consulted and so on until the kernel NameServer is reached. BindQ creates a 
hash table for mapping strings to objects when the first object is bound into the NameServer, 
so lookupQ does not need to do a hash table lookup if there are no objects installed (which will 
be the case if there are any intermediate rings with nothing loaded into them). 
7.3.4.12 O b j e c t P r o x y M a n a g e r 
A ObjectProxyHanager instance as defined in Kernel/ObjectProxyManager.ee is responsible 
for allocating and freeing Objec tProxies for one Domain. It allocates the Objec tProxies out 
of the read-only HemoryObject for the Domain. It maintains a hash table to keep track of 
objects that are already proxied and returns old Objec tProxies rather than allocating new 
ones if possible. 
The key used for the hash lookup is made up of three parts. All three parts must match 
before a proxy can be re-used. 
1. The address of the proxied object. 
2. The address of the Domain object for the Domain the proxied object is in. This is needed 
because of ring partitioning; there can be more than one Domain sharing the same address 
space so the virtual address of the proxied object is not necessarily unique. 
3. The address of the proxy table for the proxied object. It is possible to have the same 
object treated as having more than one type: its own type and any of its parent types. If 
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an application gets a proxy to an object as one of the object's parent types and later gets 
another proxy as the object's real type, the proxy for the parent type can not be reused 
because then methods available only in the subclass would not be accessible2. 
The Ob j ectProxyHanager limits the number of proxies that can be created for a particular 
Domain to prevent a runaway application from creating so many objects that too much memory 
is consumed. The number of proxies per domain are set in the MAXPROXIESPERDOMAIN 
constant in Memory/Domain.cc where the Ob j ectProxyHanager s are created. 
7 .3 .5 I n i t i a l i z a t i o n of A p p l i c a t i o n s 
The first ProcessorContext::restore() (in Includes/ProcessorContext.h) on a new A p p l i c a t i o n -
Process calls <Processor>ApplicationContext::restoreFromlnitialContext() in ProcessorDepend-
ent/<Processor>/<Processor>ContextSwitching.s That assembler function calls the C++ assist 
<Processor>ApplicationContext::initialRestoreAssist() which is defined in ProcessorDependent/-
<Processor>/<Processor>Context.cc. That assist function calls Domain::defaultProxy() in 
Memory/Domain.cc to get the default ObjectProxy to pass to the application process. In this 
way every application process is started with a proxy for TheSystemlnterface, the instantiation 
of the System Interface class in Kernel/Systemlnterface.cc. 
RestoreFromlnitialContextQ next jumps to the beginning of the application in user mode. 
The initial code there is in Libraries/SystemInterface/<Processor>/crt0.s which takes the ini-
tial proxy and passes it to _Start() in Libraries/Systemlnterface/Portable/jStart.cc. The first 
proxy call that _Start() makes is to Systemlnterface::initialCallQ which returns a pointer to the 
.ConstructProxyQ function in the kernel (see section 7.3.2 for more information). _StartQ passes 
in to initialCallQ a pointer to _defaultReturn() which is defined in crtO.s. This is used as the 
default return address for subsequent processes that are started up in the same Domain. Only 
the first process in a application goes through _Start(); other processes start at any specified 
function, and if that function returns then _defauitReturn() kills the process. 
Next, J5tart() calls _main() in Libraries/Systemlnterface/Portable/jnain.cc to initialize the 
static constructors. This is done after initialCallQ to allow the static constructors to construct 
2
 Early on in the development this was more important than now because I have since changed most proxy 
allocations to ask the object what its real type is. The only case where this is still not true is in allocation of a 
proxy for an inner ring to an object in a further-out ring. 
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proxies. For example, if a proxied object is declared at global scope, the static constructor for 
that object will call the proxy constructor. 
After that, version checking is done by calling Systemlnterface::versions(). This is covered in 
section 7.9. 
Next, .StartQ obtains standard proxies StandardNameServer, StandardOutput, and Stan-
dardlnput. The StandardNameServer is found by looking up the current process with the 
thisProcessQ function from Includes/Libraries/Systemlnterface/ThisProcess.h (which simply 
calls Systemlnterface::getThisProcessQ) and asking the proxy for the current process for the 
name server. StandardOutput and Standardlnput are then looked up in the StandardName-
Server. -StartQ next takes the StandardOutput and makes it locally buffered by creating a 
Buff eredOutputStream for it. BufFeredOutputStream is defined in Libraries/Systemlnterface/-
Portable/BufferedOutputStream.cc and is the only application-space subclass of ProxiableObject 
that is automatically included with every application. 
Lastly, .StartQ initializes the classes, proxy tables, and constructors. The first-class Class 
usage in applications is covered section 7.8. Initialization of proxy tables and constructors is 
done just like in the kernel because applications also support incoming proxy calls; proxy table 
initialization is covered in section 7.3.4.6 and the constructor initialization is covered in section 
7.3.2. 
7.4 Location of Ref Pointers 
When a structure is returned from a method, different compilers return the value in different 
ways. ProxyCallAssistQ needs to be aware of the differences because some methods return Ref s 
which are four-byte structures. 
These are the possibilities: 
Value returned in registers - Some compilers are smart enough to recognize that the struc-
ture returned is only four bytes long and can optimize the code to return the value just 
like non-structure return values. The g++ 80386 compiler does this but only when simple 
structures are returned, not when a class instance like a ' R e f is returned. 
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Pointer passed in through a register - The g++ NS32332 compiler does this. Space for 
the Ref is allocated by the caller and a pointer to it is passed in through a register. 
ProxyCallAssistQ does not need to do anything special for this case. 
Pointer passed in as second parameter - The cfront C++ translator does this. Space for 
the Ref is allocated by the caller and a pointer to it is passed in as the second parameter, 
after the this pointer. A simple "#ifdef CFRONT" is employed in ProxyCallAssistQ to skip 
over this extra parameter and copy it to the stack of the proxied method if the method 
returns a Ref. 
Pointer passed in as first parameter - The g++ 80386 compiler does this. Space for the 
Ref is allocated by the caller and a pointer to it is as passed as the first parameter, 
before the this pointer. This causes problems for ProxyCallAssistQ because it cannot know 
whether the method returns a Ref until after it has looked at the this pointer. The code to 
handle this case is enabled by the REFBEFORETHIS define. Basically, it tries to validate 
the first parameter as the this pointer and if it is not a valid pointer to an ObjectProxy, 
it notes that fact in the skipped Ref variable and goes on under the assumption that the 
second parameter is the this pointer instead. 
7.5 Reference Counting 
All objects that are proxied must be a subclass of ProxiableObject. The most important feature 
of the ProxiableObject class is that it provides reference counting. A significant portion of the 
proxy system is dedicated to properly handling reference counting to make it transparent across 
protection boundaries. 
7.5.1 Ca tch ing Reference Coun t ing M e t h o d s 
There are four methods relating to reference counting: referenceQ, unreferenceQ, noRemain-
ingReferencesQ, and the destructor. These four methods are handled specially by ProxyCallAs-
sistQ. They are detected by looking up their method numbers in the ObjectProxyCatchTable as 
defined in Includes/ObjectProxy.h. That table lists ObjectProxy (non-virtual!) methods used to 
process these methods on the ObjectProxy itself rather than on the proxied object: catchRef-
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erenceQ, catchUnreferenceQ, catchNoRemainingReferences, and catchDestructorQ, respectively. 
These methods are defined in Kernel/ObjectProxyKernel.cc. This is what these methods do: 
referenceQ - Instead of incrementing the reference count on the proxied object, increments 
the reference count on the ObjectProxy. (Also, the 'notReferenced' flag is cleared; see 
section 7.7). 
unreferenceQ - Instead of decrementing the reference count on the proxied object, decrements 
the reference count on the ObjectProxy. If the reference count on the ObjectProxy 
becomes zero, calls the catchNoRemainingReferencesQ method of ObjectProxy. 
noRemainingReferencesQ - Instead of calling the destructor of the proxied object, calls the 
catchDestructorQ method of ObjectProxy. 
the destructor - Instead of calling the destructor on the proxied object, frees the ObjectProxy 
and calls unreferenceQ on the proxied object. If the reference count on the ObjectProxy 
is not zero, prints a message and kills the current process because there was an error in 
the reference counting. 
Since the proxied object can be outside of the kernel, the unreferenceQ method cannot 
be called directly; a transfer to the ring of the proxied object must take place first. This 
is implemented through use of the return value of the "catch" methods: if the return 
value is zero, all work is assumed done. If the return value is non-zero, ProxyCallAssistQ 
transforms the call into a normal proxied call on the unreferenceQ method on the proxied 
object and proceeds. 
There are two major reasons for going through this trouble: 
1. To protect the inner rings from being affected by user programs. For example, if a user 
program called unreferenceQ more times that it was supposed to, it could have caused the 
deletion of a kernel object that was still being used by other parts of the kernel. 
2. To manage the ObjectProxies themselves. Catching these methods allows Object-
Proxies to get freed when they are no longer needed so they can be re-used. 
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7.5 .2 R e f e r e n c e C o u n t A d j u s t m e n t s 
Each ObjectProxy references its proxied object once. When an ObjectProxy is deallocated, 
its proxied object is unreferenced once. Complications arise when a proxy call returns a 
Ref; these complications may require some adjustments to the reference counts. These ad-
justments are primarily implemented in ObjectProxy::setProxiedObject() which is in Kernel/-
ObjectProxyKernel.ee and is called whenever a proxy is allocated. Other minor adjustments 
are covered in sections 7.6.3 and 7.7. 
First a brief background on reference counting and S t a r s and Ref s when proxies are not in 
the picture: when P rox iab leObjec t s are created, their reference counts begin at zero. When 
any method or function returns an asterisk ('*') pointer to a P rox iab leObjec t (including a 
constructor), the reference count on the object is normally not changed. If the invoker of the 
method wants to refer to the returned object, it assigns the returned value to a S t a r pointer 
rather than an asterisk; that assignment has a side effect of calling referenceQ on the object 
that is assigned to the S t a r . As an optimization, if the method expects that its return value 
will always be assigned to a S t a r , the method may return a Ref. The semantics there is that 
the Ref pre-references the object and when the Ref is assigned to a S t a r , no more referencing 
occurs. Assigning a Ref to another Ref also has no effect on the reference count. When a S t a r 
or Ref is destructed, it automatically unreferences the object it refers to. For more information 
on S t a r s and Ref s see [MCK91]. 
Now assume that a proxy call is being made to a method that returns an asterisk pointer 
to a subclass of ProxiableObject or a Ref (normal methods may also return S t a r s but it is 
discouraged because it is inefficient, and it is not supported on proxy calls). In either case 
a new ObjectProxy may be allocated or an old one may be reused because a proxy already 
existed for the returned object the hash table lookup matched. 
r e t u r n s a s t e r i s k -
n e w p r o x y - The reference count on the proxied object is incremented by one but the 
reference count on the ObjectProxy stays at zero. The application should assign 
the returned value to a S t a r , which will make another proxy call to referenceQ to 
reference the proxy. If the application does not reference the proxy, the proxy will 
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remain around until the application's Domain is deleted, which will deallocate all the 
application's proxies. 
reused proxy - No reference count adjustments are needed. The proxy already refer-
ences the real object. If the application assigns the returned value to a Star, the 
reference count will be incremented on the proxy. 
re turns Ref -
new proxy - The reference count on the proxied object has already been incremented 
by the Ref. The proxy in effect takes over ownership of that reference. The reference 
count on the proxy is initialized to one because the application will assume that the 
object it is getting is pre-referenced. 
reused proxy - In this case the reference count has been erroneously incremented on 
the proxied object because the proxy is only supposed to reference the object once. 
Although inefficient, for correctness the reference count has to be decremented on 
the proxied object and the reference count on the proxy has to be incremented. 
There is a problem in the Stable.9.23.1991 regarding adjustments to reference counts if the 
proxied object is outside of the kernel. In that version the kernel uses its own reference counting 
code to adjust reference counts on objects that are outside of the kernel. 
The problem is that the definition of the REFERENCE.COUNT class is different in and out of 
the kernel. In the kernel, there is a machine-dependent definition that disables interrupts. The 
user mode code cannot disable interrupts so it uses a user-level LOCK. Thus, if the kernel uses 
its own REFERENCE.COUNT code to increment or decrement the reference count on the user-
level object, it will not be obeying the user LOCK protocol and may violate mutual exclusion 
(or worse, it may get hung up because it is treating data differently in the object). 
These are possible solutions I have thought of: 
1. Have the kernel make an outcall to the object to change the reference count. This would 
be slow, and a proxy for the kernel out to that object may not already exist so a temporary 
proxy would need to be allocated. Also, since calls to referenceQ and unreferenceQ are 
normally caught and processed on the proxy itself instead of on the real object, two new 
methods would have to be added that are somehow only callable by the kernel. 
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2. Use the user-level REFERENCE.COUNT code for kernel reference counts as well as for user-
level reference counts. The user-level REFERENCE.COUNT code is much slower than the 
kernel implementation because it cannot disable interrupts; this will slow down the kernel 
considerably. Also, it may mean that a kernel-mode process and a user-mode process 
could compete for a lock for the same data (the reference count), but I do not think that 
will cause a problem. 
3. Copy the user-level REFERENCE.COUNT code (including the user-level LOCK) to the kernel 
under a different name, and use that directly in the kernel when manipulating user-level 
reference counts. This is probably the best compromise. 
7.6 Allocation, Stripping, and Validation of Proxies 
The proxy trap handler automatically allocates and strips ObjectProxies where necessary. The 
primary rule that the handler follows is that proxies are always used to cross rings and they 
are never used within the same ring. The assumption is that pointers to ProxiableObjects 
that are passed as parameters or return values will later be used to invoke methods on those 
objects. In addition, some validation must be done on all pointers passed from less-trusted 
rings to more-trusted rings to enforce protection. 
There are two major functions implementing this policy: ProxylnCallParamAssistQ and Prox-
yOutCallParamAssistQ. Both functions are used for pointer parameters and pointer return val-
ues; non-pointers are simply passed through untouched. ProxylnCallAssistQ is used for param-
eters on incalls and return values on outcalls, and likewise ProxyOutCallParamAssistQ is used 
for parameters on outcalls and return values on incalls; it turns out that the concerns for these 
pairs of cases are practically identical. In addition, there are two support functions StripProxyQ 
and AllocateProxyQ that are used by both of the major functions. All of these functions are in 
Kernel/ObjectProxyKernel.cc. 
7.6.1 ProxyInCallParamAssist() 
These are the steps done by ProxylnCallParamAssistQ: 
1. If the pointer is a type that is not a subclass of ProxiableObject, the pointer is range-
checked to ensure it points to something within the range of addresses that are accessible 
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by the caller. The assumption here is that the elevated-privilege callee will read or write 
at that address and it ought to be an address that the caller can read and write. For 
example, if the called method could read from a file into a buffer or write into a file from 
a buffer, the caller could easily read or write any value into any memory location. This 
check is done by looking up the ring that the address belongs to. in Kernel::lookupRing() 
and ensuring that the ring is greater than or equal to the ring of the caller. 
2. Otherwise if the pointer is of a type that is a subclass of ProxiableObject and the pointer 
points to a valid ObjectProxy for the calling Domain, the proxy is stripped off using 
StripProxyQ (described in section 7.6.3). But first, if the Domain of the proxied object 
is more privileged than that of the caller, the type of the proxied object is verified to 
ensure that it is a type or subtype of the expected type3 (an exception is if the proxied 
object is in a third Domain and the expected class is marked proxiable; for reasons see 
the next step). The reason for this type validation is that if the type of the object were 
incorrect, methods called on that object would not be the intended methods called. For 
example, a call to method number nine on an object that is expected to be type A would 
call a totally different method number nine on the object which is of type B; among other 
things, the parameters will be incorrect which can cause corruption of data. Since the 
object is coming from a less-trusted ring, compiler checks can not be trusted. 
3. Otherwise if the pointer points to an address in the caller's ring and the expected subclass 
of ProxiableObject is one that may be subclassed outside of the callee's ring (that is, a 
class marked with the proxiable keyword), then allocate a new proxy to that object using 
AllocateProxyQ (see section 7.6.4). There is no need to validate the type of the object, 
because if the type is incorrect then outcalls to methods on that object will only corrupt 
the less-trusted caller's space. 
7.6.2 ProxyOutCallParamAssist() 
These are the steps done by ProxyOutCallParamAssistQ: 
3The code in Stable.9.23.1991 incorrectly compares the Domain of the proxied object to that of the callee 
rather than the caller. 
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1. If the pointer is a type that is not a subclass of ProxiableObject, no checking is done. 
There is no security violation if the more-trusted ring passes a pointer into its own space 
to the less-trusted ring; the less-trusted ring will simply not be able to access the memory 
that the pointer refers to. 
2. Otherwise a distinction is made between calls from the kernel and other calls for efficiency 
reasons: calls from the kernel, the most common case because returns from incalls also 
use ProxyOutCallParamAssistQ, can be handled more efficiently than other kinds of calls. 
Since the object or proxy in this case is corning from the kernel, a call to isProxyQ can be 
trusted. This is a special method that returns zero from every subclass of Object except 
for ObjectProxies which return one. H" the object is not a proxy, a proxy is allocated for 
it with AllocateProxyQ. If the object is a proxy, an outcall is made to the classOfQ method 
on the proxy to determine what the real type of the proxied object is, and StripProxyQ is 
called to strip off the proxy and allocate a new one if needed. 
Asking the proxied object for its real type is necessary because the kernel did not do that 
when the object was passed in to the kernel in the first place; the expected class, which 
may be a superclass of the class of the real object, was used instead. For example, if 
ring 1 binds an object of its own into the NameServer in the kernel, the kernel's proxy 
is of type ProxiableObject. When ring 2 later comes along and looks up the object in the 
NameServer, the ring 1 object needs to be asked for its real class so ring 2 may make calls 
to all methods on that object, not just the ProxiableObject methods. 
Fine points: 1) If the proxied domain is the same as the domain being called, StripProxyQ 
will not allocate a new proxy so it is not necessary to find the real class of the object. 
StripProxyQ does this in Stable.9.23.1991 but it will be fixed in a later release. 2) If the 
kernel looks up the above example object in the NameServer, it will not get a proxy of 
the true type because the bind expected only a ProxiableObject. It would be nice, and 
it would make the implementation cleaner, if the true type of the object could be looked 
up when the proxy was first allocated instead of here. Unfortunately, it opens up security 
holes to ask the less-trusted object what its class is when allocating proxies to it from a 
more trusted level because the less-trusted object could lie. For example, an application 
object could say that its class is one that it had control of, a class that has a fake proxy 
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table that indicates that a proxy should be allocated for a parameter of a method when it 
should be an integer. Then, when the kernel makes an out call to that method passing an 
integer, the application could get a proxy allocated there. 3) That security hole was not 
fully closed in Stable.9.23.1991. For example, an out call from ring 0 to ring 1 that passes 
a proxy to an object from ring 2 will ask the object in ring 2 what its class is instead of 
just using the class that the ring 1 method call expects. This will also be fixed in a later 
release. 
3. Otherwise if the outcallis not from the kernel, ObjectProxyManager::isValidProxy()is called 
to see if the parameter going out is a valid proxy for the calling Domain. If it is, the 
proxied object is asked what its class is as is done if the outcall is from the kernel. The 
difference is that the kernel does not have a proxy to that object. There is a per-process 
proxy out from the kernel that is allocated the first time that Process::temporaryProxy() 
is called and never deallocated until the process dies. This proxy is used here so there is a 
minimal amount of overhead. The object that the proxy points to is set by directly calling 
ObjectProxy::setProxiedObject() instead of going through the ObjectProxyHanager, and 
reference counting is avoided to save time and complication. 
Once the class of the proxied object is obtained, StripProxyQ is called to strip the proxy 
off and allocate a new one if necessary. 
4. Otherwise if the parameter going out is not a valid proxy and the pointer points to 
an object in the calling Domain's ring, the temporary proxy is used to ask the object 
what its class is and AllocateProxyQ is called to allocate a proxy going out. Unlike in 
ProxylnCallParamAssistQ, the class of the object going out does not need to be marked 
with the p r o x i a b l e keyword because the caller here is more trusted than the callee. 
7 .6 .3 S t r i p P r o x y ( ) 
The job of StripProxy is to strip a proxy off and allocate a new one if necessary. If the called 
Domain is the same as the Domain of the object that the proxy is for, the proxy need only be 
stripped off; if the called Domain is different, StripProxyQ also calls AllocateProxyQ to allocate 
a new one. 
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In addition, if StripProxyQ is being called for the return of a method that returns a Ref, the 
caller would have erroneously incremented the reference count on the proxy. To counteract that, 
StripProxyQ decrements the reference count on the original proxy and increments the reference 
count on the new proxy or on the real object. 
If the proxy that is being stripped is one that is being returned by a method and the proxy 
has never been referenced, StripProxyQ deallocates the proxy. See section 7.7 for more details. 
7.6.4 Al loca teProxy( ) 
The reason that AllocateProxyQ exists is to keep track of proxies that are allocated for incoming 
parameters so that they may be freed on return from the proxy call. AllocateProxyQ allocates 
a proxy by simply calling ObjectProxyManager::allocateQ, but after that it does bookkeeping to 
keep track of the allocated proxies. For more information on freeing proxies that do not get 
referenced, see section 7.7. 
7.7 Freeing Not-Referenced Proxies 
As I have shown, proxies are sometimes automatically allocated for parameters to a proxy call. 
The normal semantics without proxies involved is to leave the reference counts alone on an 
object passed to a method unless the method wants to retain a pointer to the object; usually 
an object is just used temporarily so the net effect is no change to reference counts. When a 
proxy is allocated to pass to such a method, the proxy must to be deallocated when the method 
returns from the proxy call because the proxy will most likely not be used again. 
Every time a proxy is allocated by the proxy trap handler, AllocateProxyQ calls Object-
Proxy::setNotReferenced() which is in Includes/ObjectProxy.h. That method sets a bit in the 
ObjectProxy called notReferenced if the reference count of the allocated proxy is zero. "Not 
referenced" is not to be confused with "unreferenced"; "not referenced" means that the proxy 
has never had referenceQ called on it and "unreferenced" means that it has had unreferenceQ 
called on it. If the reference count was zero then setNotReferencedQ returns true, and then if 
the proxy is being allocated for a parameter going in to a method call (as opposed to a return 
value), a pointer to that proxy is saved in the return Flags. 
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When the proxy call returns, ProxyReturnAssistQ goes through the proxies that were saved 
in the returnFlags and calls ObjectProxy::freelfNotReferenced() in Kernel/ObjectProxyKernel.ee 
for each one. If the notReferenced bit in the proxy is still turned on, then freelfNotReferencedQ 
deallocates the proxy. It also decrements the reference count on the proxied object because 
the proxies reference their proxied object. It deliberately avoids calling unreferenceQ on the 
proxied object because the object should not be deleted if the reference count becomes zero; if 
the proxy had not been in the way of the call then the object would not have been deleted even 
if the reference count had started out at zero so the same thing should hold if the proxy is in 
the way. 
There is one other place where a proxy is freed if it is not referenced. If a proxy is being 
stripped off for a return value from a method call, StripProxyQ calls freelfNotReferencedQ. An 
example of this is if a proxied method in ring 1 uses another proxy call to the kernel to get a 
proxy to an object in the kernel, and then immediately returns that value4. In that case the 
proxy was only used temporarily and need not remain around. 
7.8 First-class Classes 
The hierarchy of Classes in Choices is mirrored by a hierarchy of objects known as first-class 
classes. Every subclass of Object is represented by an instance of the class called Class. This 
most important use of this hierarchy is run-time type checking. 
7.8.1 Hiera rchy of Class Hierarchies 
The hierarchy of classes in the kernel is a simple tree rooted in class Object; only single inher-
itance is supported. Since the class hierarchy can now be extended outside of the kernel, the 
first-class class hierarchy must also be extended. The extension can be done independently in 
each Domain, so there is a hierarchy of Class hierarchies that follows the Domain hierarchy. 
All Class objects are located in the kernel but they keep track of the ring they belong 
to, and their names are installed in the NameServer for the Domain that they belong to. The 
implementation requires an application to copy Class objects that represent classes in a further-
'I am not certain that this call to freelfNotReferencedQ is always the right thing to do, but I do not think it 
will cause any problems, and it solved a problem like the example. 
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in ring in order to subclass a class from the further-in ring. Copying of Class objects is handled 
automatically and discussed further in section 7.8.2. 
When a Class is first bound into the NameServer through the Class::bind() method in 
Kernel/Class.cc, it first looks in the NameServer to see if there is already a Class by that 
name. Most likely the Class will be found in the next inner ring. .If the Class is found, 
Class::bind() keeps a pointer to it in the .real pointer6. 
The Class::isClass() and Class::isASubClassOf() methods follow the .real pointers until the 
rings of the compared Classes are identical. In this way type checking can compare classes 
represented in different rings. 
The Class::sibling() method also follows the .real for use in printing the entire hierarchy of 
classes. If there are no more siblings for a Class in a particular ring, Class::sibling returns the 
first child of its parent's .real Class . For example, if an application defined a MySemaphore class 
as a child of Semaphore, MySemaphoreClass->sibling() would return a child class of Semaphore 
in the kernel such as BinarySemaphore6. 
7.8.2" I n i t i a l i z i n g C l a s s e s 
Class objects are initialized through use of Class I n s t a l l e r which is defined in Common/-
Classlnstaller.ee. C l a s s l n s t a l l e r s are statically constructed objects that contain enough 
information to later create a Class and which install themselves in a list. Classlnstaller::install() 
goes through the list and creates the C lasses . 
An implementer of a new class Foo must manually add a DEFINECLASSQ (defined in 
Includes/Common/Classlnstaller.h) macro to his source file. This macro creates a C l a s s -
I n s t a l l e r for FooClass. It also defines a Foo::classOf() method and the global variable FooClass. 
The entire source code for some classes are copied into applications, including the DEFINE-
CLASSO that defines their C la s se s . In this way every application is initialized with a C lass 
at least for Object, ProxiableObject, InputStream, OutputStream, and BufFeredOutputStream. 
In addition, Proxify++ generates an invocation of the COPYCLASSQ macro (also defined 
in Classlnstaller.h) for every proxiable class in $(MODULENAME)STUBS.cc. COPYCLASSQ 
"There is no particular reason it has to use the .real pointer, another variable could have been added to Class 
instead. 
sStable.9.23.1991 incorrectly returned the child of the parent of its own -real Class. 
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is exactly like DEFINECLASSQ except that it does not define the classOfQ method. These 
COPYCLASSQ invocations automatically make it possible to subclass proxiable classes in ap-
plications. 
7.8.3 C la s sCons t ruc to r 
There is a method called Class::constructor() that can instantiate an object of the class that 
the Class represents. This does not work for all classes, only those that have provided a 
constructor; this is used primarily in the filesystem. 
Because the object to be constructed might not necessarily be in the kernel, and because 
all Class objects are in the kernel, Class::constructor() cannot always call the constructor 
function directly. Instead, the kernel needs to make an out call through a proxy to call the 
constructor. ClassConstructor in Common/ClassConstructor.ee is the class that is proxied to 
do the job. ClassConstructor is copied into every application. Classlnstaller::install() creates a 
ClassConstructor() for every class that provides a constructor function as the fourth param-
eter of DEFINECLASSQ. 
7.9 Version Checking 
The version checking subsystem keeps track of a version string for every proxiable class. During 
initialization of an application (covered in section 7.3.5), each proxiable class that the applica-
tion uses is checked to ensure that the interface the application expects matches the interface 
that the kernel (or other proxied load module) provides. This catches many common develop-
ment errors. 
To prepare for that, Kemel::main() finds the list of provided versions by calling Provided-
Versionlnstaller::listQ in Common/Versionlnstaller.cc. That list was created using static con-
structors in Configure/System/<Machine>/PROVIDEDVERSIONS.cc which is automatically 
generated by the makefiles. That file includes a call to the macro PROVIDEDVERSIONQ which 
is defined in Includes/Common/VersionInstaller.h for each proxiable class. Each time an alter-
nate header file changes, the makefiles generate a new version string for that class using the 
output of the 'date' command. Header files that do not change use the old version strings. The 
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static constructors for ProvidedVersionlnstaller save the date string and install themselves in a 
list. 
Kernel::main() passes that list to VersionObject::install() in Kernel/VersionObject.ee which 
creates a VersionObject for each element and installs each VersionObject in the NameServer. 
The versions on the application side are similar but there is an extra level of indirection. 
Proxify++ generates a call to the REQUIREDVERSIONQ macro inside every generated header 
file. That macro is defined in Versionlnstaller.h. Wherever the generated header files are 
included, REQUIREDVERSIONQ creates a statically constructed RequiredVersionlnstaller 
object which installs itself in the RequiredVersion list so that only classes that are actually used 
by the application have their versions checked. Because the header file may be included from 
many different source files in the application, to save space the version string is not included 
in the RequiredVersionlnstaller but instead there is a pointer to a Vers ionlns ta l le r ob-
ject for that class. One Vers ionlns ta l ler object for every available class is created through 
the the VERSIONQ macro in Configure/System<Machine>/SystemVERSIONS.cc. That file 
is compiled into the library that is linked with applications and is exactly the same as the 
PR0VIDEDVERSIONS.ee that is linked with the kernel except for the macro names7. 
In addition, a VERSIONQ is generated for the files that are compiled with both applica-
tions and the kernel in Configure/System/<Machine>/TableOnlyProxyVersion.cc. This file 
is updated whenever any of the files listed in the $(TABLEONLYPROXYTNCLUDES) make 
variable change (this list includes files that are copied into applications). This contents of this 
file is copied into SystemVERSIONS.ee and from there into PROVTDEDVERSIONS.ee. 
During the initialization of applications, the RequiredVersionlnstaller list is given to 
VersionObject::check() which looks up each version in the list from the NameServer and warns 
if the version is not found or if the versions do not match. 
7The name "System", the $(MODULENAME) make variable, is included in the filename to distinguish it 
from other VERSIONS files of other proxiable modules that an application uses. The g++ compiler could not link 
in two files with the same name because it generates a symbol in each file including the filename that becomes 
multiply defined at link time. 
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7.10 Running Applications in Any Ring 
I have provided a user interface to create new Domains in any ring outside of the kernel and to 
run applications in any Domain outside of the kernel. The following commands can be used at 
the "Enter application" prompt, as implemented in Kernel::getMemoryObjectOflnitialApplication: 
n e w D o m a i n - create a new Domain. 'newDomain' takes two parameters: the name or number 
of the parent of this Domain in the Domain hierarchy and a name for the new Domain. 
The newly created Domain will be in the next ring further out from the parent. If just 
a number is used for the parent Domain, where the number is < APPLICATIONRING, 
then the default Domain for that ring is used. Default Domains are created for the kernel 
and each intermediate ring at boot time. If a number is not used, then the name is looked 
up in the NameServer. The newly created Domain is put into the NameServer under the 
given name. Examples: "newDomain 0 doml" creates a new Domain in ring 1 called 
'doml' and "newDomain doml dom2" creates a new Domain on top of that in ring 2 
called 'dom2\ 
load - load a new application into an existing Domain and start a process in it but do not 
wait for the process to complete. The first parameter must be either a default Domain 
number to load into or a name of a Domain that was created with 'newDomain'. The 
second parameter is the complete path name of the executable. Any more parameters 
will get passed as argc/argv to the program. Another "Enter application" prompt will 
come back immediately because 'load' does not wait for the process to finish. Example: 
"load 1 loadl". 
run - run a new application in a new Domain, start a process in it, and wait for the process 
to complete. This is much like just entering the name of the application except it allows 
you to specify a different domain that you want the application to run above. It takes 
a first parameter of the Domain that will be the parent of the new Domain created for 
the application; the parameter can be a number or a name. The second parameter is the 
complete pathname for the executable. Any more parameters will be passed as argc/argv 
to the application. Example: "run 2 /Bin/timings fast". 
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7.11 Summary 
This chapter has given implementation details on the proxy subsystem of Choices. The chapter 
has provided information that is useful to those who desire to thoroughly understand how the 
subsystem works and to those who desire to modify it. The implementation supports the strict 
enforcement of protection, provides language transparency, performs adequately, and provides 
for more than two protection levels. 
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Chapter 8 
Performance 
In this chapter I discuss the performance of the proxy subsystem. All of the tunings were taken 
by executing calls at least 10,000 times and dividing the total time taken by the number of 
times the calls were made. Thus the times are average elapsed time, including any repetitive 
system overhead such as clock interrupts. 
The timings on Choices were taken with the 'timings' application program which tests and 
times all combinations of calls between three rings. The timings on Unix1 [Bou83] were taken 
with a similar Unix program. Not all of the results are included here; I have summarized the 
interesting ones. Choices timings were not taken on the Stable.9.23.1991 version, they were 
taken on a version that had a few problems mentioned in chapter 7 fixed. 
Timings taken by this scheme are not precisely consistent and often vary by 5%. The 
measurements given here are the average of two runs. 
8.1 Comparison to Unix System Calls 
Table 8.1 shows a comparison between simple Unix system calls and proxy calls. The AT&T6386 
PC is based on a 20MHZ Intel 80386 processor and the Multimax is based on 10MHZ National 
Semiconductor 32332 processors. The Multimax is a shared memory multiprocessor, but only 
one processor is used for these timings. 
^ n i x is a trademark of AT&T. 
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Unix getpid() 
Unix time(O) 
Null proxy call 
AT&T6386 
118/is 
118/is 
84/xs 
Multimax 
97/xs 
171^s 
136/xs 
Table 8.1: Simple Unix system calls versus Choices null proxy calls. 
The null proxy call is a call to TheSystemlnterface->null() in the kernel which takes no 
parameters and immediately returns. There is no exact equivalent in Unix, but getpid() and 
timeQ are simple Unix calls that should need to do little extra work. As the table shows, proxy 
calls and Unix system calls take roughly the same amount of time.2 
By contrast, local C++ virtual function calls on both machines take 6/iS. Crossing the 
protection boundary into the kernel takes more than an order of magnitude longer on both 
operating systems. That cost must be weighed against the advantages of having protection. If 
an application requires high performance, it may have to be designed to minimize the number 
of times that protection boundaries are crossed. 
8.2 Calls Between Rings 
Table 8.2 shows the times for null proxy calls between different rings. 
Incall to kernel 
Outcall from kernel 
Incall to non-kernel 
Outcall from non-kernel 
AT&T6386 
84/is 
185/xs 
192/iS 
195/*s 
Multimax 
136/is 
256/xs 
339/xs 
341/JS 
Table 8.2: Null proxy calls between rings. 
Calls to rings other than the kernel take approximately twice as long as calls to the kernel. 
Since calls into the kernel are the most common case, they have been optimized the most. Calls 
21 have found that the Multimax tends to be about 30% slower than the AT&T6386 so the Multimax getpid() 
timing is a bit surprising. I included time() to show that perhaps the Multimax version of Unix is optimised for 
getpidQ. 
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to non-kernel rings first trap to the kernel and perform the normal operations of kernel calls as 
well as the following additional operations: 
1. Different user mode stacks are needed for each ring outside of the kernel, so the correct 
one is located and set up. 
2. C++ compilers assume that some processor registers are not modified by function invoca-
tions, but a call to user mode cannot be trusted to leave those registers unmodified. In 
order to prevent detrimental effects on the kernel caused by the registers being modified, 
the registers are saved before switching to user mode and restored upon return from user 
mode. 
3. Memory to be protected from the called ring is made inaccessible and memory to be avail-
able from the called ring is made accessible. This is done differently on the AT&T6386 
and Multimax, as explained in section 4.2. On the AT&T6386, this is accomplished by 
changing data segments which is a very fast operation. On the Multimax, it is accom-
plished by loading a different page table. This is only necessary when switching between 
two different non-kernel rings; page tables can contain different protection for kernel and 
user modes, and user mode is used for all non-kernel rings. The extra 80/xs for calls 
between two non-kernel rings on the Multimax is due to changing to a new page table 
before the call and restoring the old one afterward. This increase amounts to only 30% 
above outcalls from the kernel. 
4. The method is executed in user mode, and when the method returns it traps back to the 
kernel. 
An alternative to using intermediate rings would be to run server code in an entirely separate 
Domain and send messages to the server process, similar to remote procedure calls. This 
alternative inherently has extra overhead of passing messages through either copying the data 
or some other way of sharing. That overhead is not present with intermediate rings because 
data in the outer rings is directly accessible to called methods on incalls. In addition, sharing 
of address space makes rings easier to incorporate into a language such as C++ which assumes 
one large address space. 
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For the rest of the tunings in this chapter there is no fundamental difference between the 
Multimax and AT&T6386 so I will concentrate on the AT&T6386 only. 
8.3 Parameters 
The proxy trap handler processes every parameter to a proxy call and thus takes extra overhead 
for every parameter. Table 8.3 shows the extra time taken for different kinds of parameters. 
0. No parameters 
1. One integer 
2. Two integers 
3. Non-ProxiableObject pointer 
4. Called-ring ProxiableObject pointer 
5. Caller-ring ProxiableObject pointer 
6. - additional for new proxy 
above 
-
0 
1 
1 
3 
3 
5 
Incall 
kernel 
84us 
25/is 
6/xs 
21/JS 
45/is 
221/is 
296/JS 
Outcall 
kernel 
185/JS 
14/is 
6/xs 
llflS 
31fis 
190/is 
290/JS 
Incall 
non-krnl 
192/xs 
14us 
6/xs 
23/is 
45/is 
220/is 
289/xs 
Outcall 
non-krnl 
195/is 
14/is 
6/is 
11/iS 
33/is 
560/xs 
285/JS 
Table 8.3: Times for proxy call parameters on AT&T6386. 
The "above" column indicates the line number that this line should be added to for the 
total time. Apply the addition recursively to find the total time for a call. For example, to 
find the total time for a call with a single called-ring ProxiableObject pointer parameter, add a 
column from line 4 to the same column from lines 3, 1, and 0; for an incall to the kernel that 
is 175/zs. To find the time for subsequent parameters use line 2 instead of line 1; for example a 
second ProxiableObject parameter on an incall to the kernel adds 72/zs for a total of 247/is. 
Here is a discussion of each of the lines in the table: 
0. Copied from table 8.2. 
1. The existence of any parameters requires some set-up time. A call to the kernel with no 
parameters is specially optimized, so the first parameter for calls to the kernel adds more 
than the first parameter for calls to other rings. 
2. Each additional non-pointer parameter adds an insignificant amount of time. 
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3. Incall pointer parameters that do not point to subclasses of ProxiableObject are range-
checked to ensure that the pointer is an address that the caller has access to. This 
checking does not occur on outcalls. 
4. A caller passing a parameter that points to an instance of a subclass of ProxiableObject 
in the called ring implies that a proxy is being passed. Extra time is taken to verify that 
the proxy is valid for the caller. In addition, incalls verify that the type of the proxied 
object is an expected type. 
5. A caller passing a parameter that points to an instance of a subclass of ProxiableObject 
in its own ring implies that a proxy to the object must be allocated for the called ring. 
Proxy allocation first looks up the proxied object in a hash table and then re-uses a proxy 
if one already exists. The times in line 5 of the table are for re-use of a proxy. The extra 
time for an outcall from a non-kernel ring is caused by the kernel trap handler making 
an extra outcall to the calling ring to find out the actual type of the object being passed. 
This is necessary because the type may be a subtype of the expected type, and a later 
incall using that proxy will need to know the exact type. This is discussed in more detail 
in section 7.6.2. 
6. If a proxy did not already exist, a new one is allocated on the way in to the proxy call and 
freed on the way out. This additional time is the same for all the kinds of calls and includes 
installing an element into the hash table and removing it again. A general purpose hash 
table implementation is used here which could probably be improved. The time gets even 
longer with this hash table implementation if the hash table slot was already in use: an 
additional 456/is is taken in that case to create and delete a new slot. 
8.4 Returning Proxies 
Returning pointers to subclasses of ProxiableObject implies returning proxies. Presumably a 
proxy that is returned will be used multiple times to invoke methods; thus the returning of 
proxies will be relatively rare and the length of time that they take might not significantly 
affect overall performance of an application. 
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7. Returner-ring pre-existing proxy 
8. - additional for new proxy 
above 
0 
7 
Incall 
kernel 
233/xs 
381/xs 
Outcall 
kernel 
250/xs 
483/xs 
Incall 
non-krnl 
578/xs 
490/xs 
Outcall 
non-krnl 
251/xs 
496/xs 
Table 8.4: Times for returning ProxiableObject pointers on AT&T6386. 
Table 8.4 shows times for returning pointers to subclasses of ProxiableObject. Here is a 
discussion of each line: 
7. The return value of an incall is very much like a parameter of an outcall, and the return 
value of an outcall is very much like a parameter of an incall. Thus returning a pointer to 
an object in the returner's ring is much like passing a pointer to an object in the caller's 
ring as shown in line 5 of table 8.3. 
8. One difference between parameters and return values is that proxies allocated for param-
eters are automatically deallocated when the call returns; that is not the case for return 
values. Since I do timings by repeated calls and since an application is limited in the 
number of proxies that may be allocated for it, the times for this line include an extra 
call to explicitly deallocate the proxy. The extra call is reflected in additional time over 
the 290/xs of line 6 in table 8.3. The additional 90/xs for incalls to the kernel and 200/xs 
for other calls are approximately the same as times for null calls. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions 
This research has developed and studied a mechanism to support object-oriented hierarchies 
across protection boundaries. The mechanism strictly enforces protection and yet is as trans-
parent as possible to the programmer to allow a uniform object-oriented programming model. 
The mechanism has adequate performance so as to not preclude its use. 
The mechanism is transparent: it automatically and transparently inserts and removes 
special objects called proxy objects which are used to cross a protection boundary and to 
invoke methods on individual objects on the other side of the boundary. Applications not only 
can interface with system objects as if they are local objects, they can also incrementally modify 
the behavior of the system objects for their own use through inheritance. The operating system 
can also take advantage of the inclusion polymorphism of type hierarchies to define interfaces 
through which it can call out to less-privileged subtypes. 
The performance of crossing protection boundaries is adequate: method invocations into the 
kernel with no parameters takes approximately the same amount of time as a Unix system call, 
and the extra time taken for allocation and removal of proxy objects for parameters and return 
values is not detrimental because those operations only occur on a relatively small percentage 
of calls in a typical application. My implementation also uses intermediate rings to support 
structuring of the operating system into kernel and non-kernel portions; calls to the intermediate 
rings take more time than calls to the kernel, but they are faster than calls to separate address 
spaces because message passing is not required. 
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The study of this mechanism led to an analysis of the fundamental problems caused by 
splitting type hierarchies and inheritance hierarchies across protection boundaries. The analysis 
is independent of language, system, and protection model. The analysis revealed the precautions 
that must be taken to guard against protection violations in an object-oriented system with 
protection boundaries. The analysis also showed that in the general case an object must be 
able to be split across the protection boundaries, and that the portion of the object belonging 
to a child in an object-oriented hierarchy should delegate or preferably forward unrecognized 
method calls to the parent portion of the object on the other side of the boundary. 
The remainder of this final chapter contains a summary of conclusions, a summary of prob-
lems caused by the implementation constraints, and suggestions for future work. 
9.1 S u m m a r y of Conclusions 
The following is a summary of conclusions that can be drawn from this research: 
1. Extending object-oriented hierarchies beyond the kernel of an operating system is worth-
while because it provides a uniform computation model to programmers of object-oriented 
applications. It is also worthwhile for structuring the operating system itself into portions 
inside and outside of a minimal kernel, as demonstrated by the successful operation of 
the filesystem outside of the Choices kernel. 
2. A ring structure with shared address spaces fits well with the introduction of protection 
boundaries into an object-oriented language that is based on one large shared address 
space. The shared memory semantics that this provides is nearly transparent to the 
programmer, deviating only where transparency would cause protection violations. In 
addition, the time that it takes to make calls to intermediate rings compares favorably to 
the time that it would take to call to a separate address space because of the necessity 
of message passing when separate address spaces are employed. Performance of calls to 
intermediate rings is even better when the hardware is powerful enough to render changing 
page tables unnecessary. 
3. Using proxies to control the crossing of protection boundaries in an object-oriented system 
is practical and efficient. A method call into the kernel using a proxy takes approximately 
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the same amount of time as a system call in Unix. Automating the allocation, validation, 
and stripping of proxy parameters and return values makes the proxies practically trans-
parent to the programmer and eliminates sources of errors that are caused by hand-coding 
those tasks. This automation can reliably assist in satisfying the following requirements 
which are applicable to any system that provides object-oriented hierarchies across pro-
tection boundaries: 
(a) Untrusted subjects should be permitted to invoke methods only on objects to which 
they have obtained rights. This is satisfied by proxies only giving the capability to 
invoke methods on specific objects. In addition, new proxies are only allocated for 
objects that are returned or passed in through other proxy calls. 
(b) Untrusted subjects should be permitted to invoke only selected methods on the 
objects to which they have access. This is satisfied in my system by marking a 
method with the proxiable keyword. 
(c) Objects passed in as parameters to a method call across protection boundaries should 
be validated to ensure that the caller has the right to use those objects. This is sat-
isfied in a proxy-based system by validating that parameters that refer to protected 
objects are proxies that the caller has the right to use. Also, stripping the proxies 
off so the called method does not have to deal with those proxies and/or allocating 
new proxies for the object parameters is required if proxies can only be used by one 
domain. 
(d) If objects passed in as parameters to a method call across protection boundaries do 
not trust the caller, the type of the objects should be validated to ensure they are of 
a type that the called method expects. This may be automatic in a language that 
has run-time type checking, but it needs to be added to languages like C++ that have 
no run-time type checking. 
(e) Untrusted subjects should be permitted to create only objects that belong to subjects 
that have chosen to allow it, and untrusted subjects should only be permitted to 
delete objects that they have created. In my system, creation is controlled by only 
allowing creation of proxied objects that have their constructors marked with the 
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proxiable keyword, and deletion is controlled by only deleting proxied objects when 
their reference counts become zero. 
(f) The object types that can be polymorphically replaced by an object of an untrusted 
subtype should be restricted to only selected types. This is satisfied in my system 
by marking a class definition with the proxiable keyword. 
4. The portions of an object that belong to a superclass and subclass in an implementation 
hierarchy where the superclass is more trusted than the subclass should be handled in 
one of two ways: 
(a) If a superclass does not need to cause side effects in its own protection domain, 
it is better to copy the superclass code into the subclass' protection domain and 
to place the entire object at that combined level. Unfortunately this is potentially 
problematic in a language like C++ because the same class description has to be used 
for both the copy of the superclass and for proxies to the original superclass. 
(b) If the superclass must continue to be able to cause side effects at its more powerful 
trust level, the portions of the object belonging to the superclass and subclass must 
be protected at the different trust levels. Method calls that the subclass does not 
redefine should be delegated or forwarded to the superclass portion of the object. 
Forwarding is preferred to delegation in this case because delegation implies that 
further method calls on the same object could call back out to the less trusted 
subclass portion of the object; that should only happen in a controlled manner. 
5. The best design of an object-oriented hierarchy in the absence of protection boundaries 
may not be the best design when protection boundaries are introduced. Crossing protec-
tion boundaries is costly, and a class hierarchy may need to be redesigned to minimize 
the number of times that the boundaries are crossed. 
9.2 Problems Caused by Implementation Constraints 
The two major constraints on my implementation were the use of the C++ language and the 
use of traditional processor protection hardware. 
These are the problems caused by the choice of C++ as an implementation language: 
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1. The lack of run-time type information and type checking causes the biggest problems. 
Type checking needs to be performed when protection boundaries are crossed because 
callers cannot be trusted to obey compile-time type checks. First-class classes were created 
to represent the type hierarchy at run-time, and Proxify++ was created to generate the 
type information for methods that can be called across protection boundaries. 
The lack of run-time type information also makes it impossible for the run-time system 
to know the format of all parameters that are passed across protection boundaries. A 
consequence of this is that pointers to arbitrary data should not be included in any struc-
tures passed as parameters to privileged methods because the pointers are not checked to 
ensure they point to memory that the caller has the right to access. 
2. The lack of garbage collection in C++ causes difficulties for cleaning up protected objects; 
non-privileged users must not be allowed to directly delete protected objects. To get 
around these difficulties, reference-counting was used; this works, but garbage collection 
is more convenient and reliable. 
3. The use of header files to describe class interfaces and implementation details ( that is, 
member variables) in C++ causes problems. Proxify++ gets around some of the problems 
by generating an alternate header file with non-accessible methods and implementation 
details removed. 
However, there is still a problem when the same header file is needed to interface with 
a class that is both copied into a ring and accessed through a proxy. In that case an 
alternate header file cannot be used when going through a proxy so the class interface has 
to be restricted so that all virtual methods are proxiable, and users of the proxy have 
to be careful to not try to access any of the member variables which do not exist in the 
proxy. 
4. Since C++ implements parent and child portions of objects in contiguous memory, splitting 
an implementation hierarchy across protection boundaries requires simulation of inheri-
tance by forwarding. A delegation-based language such as Self would have an easier time 
with this. Simulating true delegation in C++ requires changing the interface to pass an 
additional parameter referring to the child object. 
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5. Since C++does not allow the separation of implementation hierarchies and type hierarchies, 
the generality of my research is reduced. Languages that do allow the separation may 
have additional problems that have not been uncovered by this research. 
The use of traditional processor protection hardware for this implementation causes reduc-
tion in performance. Protection hardware that had more than two protection levels directly 
supported would be the fastest. The requirement of switching page tables when switching rings 
on processors without segmentation is particularly inefficient. 
9.3 Future Work 
Here are some suggestions for possible extensions to this research: 
1. More services that are currently a part of the Choices kernel could be moved out into 
an intermediate ring. The networking code is an excellent candidate for the next large 
portion to move. 
2. Cross-calls to separate address spaces could be implemented and evaluated. Many of the 
techniques of remote procedure calls would have to be employed. Work is already in 
progress to implement remote procedure calls in Choices, and that work could also be 
applied to invoke methods on objects in different address spaces on the local machine. 
3. The techniques of this research could be applied to other languages and operating sys-
tems. Applying the techniques to an object-oriented language with dynamic run-time 
type checking and garbage collection such as CLOS would be particularly interesting so 
it could be compared to my system which uses substitutes for those features because they 
were not a part of C++. 
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Appendix A 
Source Files 
This appendix lists all Choices source files related to the proxy subsystem in some way. The 
list does not include the source files of Proxify++itself; those are discussed in section 7.1.3. 
Most of the '.cc' files listed here have corresponding '.h' files under the 'Includes' directory. 
The '.h' files that do not have corresponding '.cc' files are included explicitly in this list. 
If the file is discussed in more detail in another section, the section number is in parentheses 
after the filename. 
Applicat ions/Examples/pk.cc - An application to peek or poke a specified address to ver-
ify whether or not an address is protected from applications. Also tests outcalls by 
using Process::setFaultHandler() and creating its own FaultHandler which is called by Do-
main::basicRepairFault when there is a page fault. 
Applications/Examples/t imings.cc - An application that tests and times all combinations 
of incalls and outcalls using the Timinglnterface in the kernel. If the intermediate Example 
load module (loadl) is loaded into ring 1, also tests and times calls to and from that ring 
using the SubTiminglnterface. 
Applications/Examples/twoproc.cc - Example application that creates another process 
and a semaphore. Twoproc declares the Semaphore at global scope rather than creating 
it using new and in so doing tests _PostConstructProxy() and method stubs. 
Applications/FiSh/Hierarchy.cc - The "hierarchy" command in FiSh prints out the ring 
number that Classes belongs to if they are not in the kernel. 
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Applications/LoadableExample/SubTiminglnterface.cc - A subclass of Timinglnterface 
(which is in the kernel) to test and time incalls and outcalls to and from an intermediate 
ring. Used by the 'timings' application. 
Applications/LoadableExample/TestObject .h - Simple test object that is added to the 
NameServer for ring 1 and made available to applications. 
Applications/LoadableExample/main.cc - The main part of the Example loadable mod-
ule. Creates a TestObject and a FileSystemlnterface. The source for the filesystem 
in this module is taken directly from the FileSystems directory, the same one that is used 
for the kernel. The process exits but the code remains loaded until the Domain is deleted 
at system shut down time. 
Common/ClassConstructor .cc (7.8.3) - Ensures that constructors called via Class-con-
st ructorQ are called in the correct ring of protection. 
Common/Classlnstal ler .cc (7.8.2) - Defines Classes. 
Common/Constructor lnstal ler .cc (7.3.2) - Defines constructors that are callable through 
proxies. 
Conimon/InputStream.cc - Defines InputStream abstract superclass. Copied into all ap-
plications. 
Common/Object .cc - Defines the base class of most objects in Choices. Copied into all 
applications. Contains default definition of the method isProxy() which returns zero. 
Also contains identity() method which returns the this pointer for use in case a proxy is 
in the way of an object1. 
Common/OutputSt ream.cc - Defines OutputStream abstract superclass. Copied into all 
applications so printfQ and other methods are processed in user space. 
Common/ProxiableObject .cc - Abstract superclass of all objects that need reference count-
ing. All proxied objects need reference counting, so they must be instances of subclasses 
of this class. 
'Now that proxies are always stripped oft* within a Domain and proxies to a particular object are reused, 
identity() should no longer be necessary. 
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Common/ProxyTable.cc (7.1.2, 7.3.4.6) - Definition of the proxy table. Also the definition 
of ProxyTablelnstaller which is used to locate and initialize proxy tables. 
Common/Versionlnstaller.cc (7.9) - Defines version strings for proxied classes that are 
required and provided. 
Configure/<Machine>Common.mk (7.2) - Defines machine-specific make variables and 
rules. 
Configure/Applications/ApplicationsCommon.mk (7.2) - Defines make variables and 
rules that are useful for all applications and loadable modules. Puts different directories in 
the $(COMMONHVPATH), includes different libraries, and includes ProxifyCommon.mk 
for loadable modules; that is, if $(MODULENAME) is set. 
Configure/ChoicesCcmmon.mk (7.2) Defines make variables and rules that are useful for 
all of Choices. 
Configure/LoadableExample/ExampleCommon.mk - Example makefile for a loadable 
module. 
Conngure/System/<Machine>/LoaderDirect ives (7.3.4.5) - This is the place that the 
KernelReadOnlyStart and KernelReadOnlyEnd variables are defined for both Att6386 and 
Multimax. On compilation systems that do not have COFF link editors, this mechanism 
will not work. Those variables could then be denned using assembler globals or something 
similar. 
Configure/System/CommonSources.mk - Lists source files that are common to kernel 
and applications. 
Configure/System/FileSystemsCommon.mk - Lists sources for the filesystem. These are 
here and not in SystemCommon.mk because the filesystem is included in both the kernel 
and in the Example loadable module. 
Configure/ Sys tem/ Proxify Common.mk (7.2) - Makefile included by makefiles of modules 
that want files proxified. 
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Conflgure/System/SystemCommon.mk - Makefile that defines the portion of Choices ker-
nels that are common across different machine types. 
Includes/Librar ies /SystemInterface/REFERENCE_COUNT.h (7.5.2) - Definition of 
reference counts for applications. This is portable, unlike the machine-dependent one in 
the kernel. However, it is slower because applications cannot disable interrupts to aid in 
mutual exclusion. Instead, a user-level LOCK is used. 
Includes/Libraries/Systemlnterface/ThisProcess.h (7.3.5) - Definition of thisProcess() 
for applications. Uses the Systemlnterf ace to get the information from the kernel via a 
proxy call. 
Includes/MachineDependent /<Machine>/<Machine>CPUConflgurat ion.h 
(7.3.4.1) - Place where APPLICATIONRING is defined. 
Kerne l /CPU.cc (7.3.4.3) - Has a method setRingRange() which is called at initialization time. 
May be overloaded by processor-dependent subclasses; if not, the method does nothing. 
Kernel/Class.cc (7.8) - First-class classes. Supports hierarchy of class hierarchies across 
rings. 
Kernel /ConstructorDescriptor .ee (7.3.2) - Descriptor for proxiable constructors. 
Kernel/Kernel .cc (7.3.4) - Definition of the Kernel class which is primarily a catch-all class 
for things that would otherwise be global; there is only one instance of this class. It is 
intimately involved with the initialization of the proxy subsystem, and it keeps track of 
the address ranges of rings. 
Kernel/NameServer.cc (7.3.4.11) - The name server class. The HameServer hierarchy fol-
lows the Domain hierarchy. 
Kernel /ObjectProxyKernel .cc (7.3) - The corresponding header file is Ihcludes/Object-
Proxy.h. Defines most of the ObjectProxy class and the machine-independent portion of 
the proxy trap handler. 
Kernel /ObjectProxyManager .ee (7.3.4.12) - Manages allocating and freeing proxies. For 
every Domain there is one ObjectProxyHanager. 
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Kernel/ObjectProxyVtable.cc (7.3.1) - Contains the ObjectProxy constructor and isProxy() 
method. These are in a separate file so they can be made to be readable outside of the 
kernel. 
Kernel/Process.cc (7.3.3, 7.6.2) - Definitions of processes. Has some support for proxies, 
including keeping track of the current Domain and maintaining a temporary proxy for 
each process. 
Kernel/ProxyTableCopy.cc (7.3.4.6) - Definition of the kernel copy of ProxyTable. 
Kernel/Systemlnterface.cc (7.3.5) - Every application is started with a proxy to the sole 
instance of this class. Contains miscellaneous system calls that do not fit well in other 
proxiable classes. 
Kernel/Timinglnterface.cc - Class for testing and timing incalls into and outcalls from the 
kernel. Used by the 'timings' applications. 
Kernel/TwoLevelPageTable.cc (7.3.3) - AddressTranslation used by both Att6386 and 
Multimax, although it is not portable to all architectures. Contains support for mul-
tiple ring protection when the "MULTIRINGTRANSLATION" define is turned on. 
Kernel/VersionObject.ee (7.9) - Class to enable installation of version checking information 
into the NameServer hierarchy. 
Librar ies /GeneralPurpose/Portable/HashTable .cc - Contains general purpose hashing 
functions. Used both by the Proxify++ tool and by the ObjectProxyHanager. HashTable 
was extended for the ObjectProxyHanager to allow hashing on fixed-length arbitrary 
data and optimized to improve performance of proxy allocation. 
Librar ies/SystemInterface/<Processor>/Constructors .s (7.3.2) - Definition of proxy 
constructor stubs. 
Libraries/SystemInter£ace/<Processor>/crt0.s (7.3.5) - Application processes begin ex-
ecuting at the beginning of this file. 
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Libraries/SystemInterface/Portable/BufferedOutputStream.cc (7.3.5) - Application-
level subclass of OutputStream that buffers output to the stream until the buffer is full or 
a newline or a flush(). 
Libraries/Systemlnterface/Portable/LOCK.cc - A user-level lock that is not portable 
but should be correct for Att6386 and Multimax. Assumes atomic increment and decre-
ment. Avoids making a system call if there is no contention for the lock. The algorithm 
is not "fair"; that is, it has possibilities of starvation. 
Libraries/Systemlnterface/Portable/jStart.cc (7.3.5, 7.3.2) - Machine-independent por-
tions of application initialization and other miscellaneous machine-independent functions 
including _PostConstructProxy() for use by all applications. 
MachineDependent/<Machine>/<Machine>Kernel.cc (7.3.4.2) - Defines variables for 
the Kernel that define the start and length of rings. 
Memory/AddressTranslator.ee (7.3.3) - The parent class for MMUs. The activateQ and 
basicActivate() methods were extended to accept a parameter of the context of the process 
being executed. The processor-dependent basic ActivateQ uses that to find out the current 
ring number of the process being activated if the MMU implements the ring protection. 
Memory/Domain.cc (7.3.4.10) - Representation of address spaces. Extended to support 
multiple rings. Maintains a pointer to an ObjectProxyHanager and a pointer to the 
default ObjectProxy for the Domain. 
Memory/DummyMemoryObject.cc (7.3.4.5) - Contains definitions of the HemoryObjects 
that represent pre-mapped kernel memory. 
Memory/FaultHandler.cc - Base class for a user-defined page fault handler, called by Do-
main::basicRepairFault(). 
Memory/PremappedMemoryObjectCache.cc (7.3.4.5) - The HemoryObject Cache used 
by the PhysicallyResidentHemoryObject which maps the portions of the kernel memory 
that are not readable and the portions that are read-only. 
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Memory/Vir tualMemoryRange.ee (7.3.4.3) - This is the class that describes ranges of vir-
tual memory addresses to initialize the ADDRESS.TRANSLATION class. It was extended 
to include a ring number that the address range belongs to. 
ProcessorDependent /<Processor>/<Processor>CPU.cc (7.3.3, 7.3.4.3) - This is the 
processor-dependent representation of the processor itself. A setRingRangeQ method was 
added to initialize any support of rings that the CPU might do; this is used on the 80386 
but not on the NS32332. 
ProcessorDependent /<Processor>/<Processor>Context .cc (7.3.3, 7.3.5) - This is the 
processor-dependent representation of process context. Contains methods for managing 
switches between rings, particularly saveUserStackQ, setNewRingQ, and restoreRingQ. 
ProcessorDependent /<Processor>/<Processor>ContextSwitching.s (7.3) - Contains 
the lowest-level portion of the proxy trap handler. 
ProcessorDependent /<Processor>/<Proces8or>MMU.cc (7.3.3) - This is the process-
or-dependent representation of the memory-management unit. The basicActivateQ meth-
od was extended to accept a pointer to the process context from which it determines the 
ring the process is running in and passes that information to the translation. 
ProcessorDependent/<Processor>/<Processor>asmdefs .cc - Source for the file from 
which structure-element offset defines are created by the 'makhead' tool. These de-
fines go into Configure/System/<Machine>/<Processor>asmdefs.h and are included by 
<Processor>ContextSwitching.s to access elements in structures. ObjectProxy.h is in-
cluded here in <Processor>asmdefs.cc so defines for support of proxies will be generated. 
ProcessorDependent /<Processor>/ObjectProxyStubs.s (7.3) - The stubs that proxy 
method calls execute. These stubs are in the kernel but readable by applications. 
Tools/Misc/Constcollect.sh (7.2) - Collects constructor names out of a C++ source file by 
compiling the file and looking in the symbol table for names that are of the form of 
constructors. 
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Appendix B 
Output Files 
This appendix lists files automatically generated by Proxify++ or the make process, including 
a description of each file. These files are generated for each module that includes Configure/-
System/ProxifyCommon.mk. 
All files except the alternate header files are in the Configure/$(MODULENAME)/$(MA-
CHINE) directories, where $(MODULENAME) is "System" or "LoadableExample" and $(MA-
CHINE) is "Att6386" or "Multimax". 
If the file is discussed in more detail in another section, the section number is in parentheses 
after the filename. 
Alternate header flies (7.1.2) - For every header file that is proxified, another header file with 
the implementation details removed is generated in the Includes/$(MODULENAME)/-
$(MACHTNE) directory. These alternate header files are included by applications 
AUIncludes.ee (7.2) - A list of header files for which alternate header files should be kept. Used 
by ProxifyCommon.mk after Proxify++ is run. Generated from the l(ALLINCLUDES) 
make variable. 
CONSTRUCTORINSTALLERS.ee (7.3.2) - A two-line file that includes Constructorln-
staller.h and CONSTRUCTORS.h. This is compiled and linked with the proxied module 
(that is, the kernel or 'loadl') to define the proxied constructors that are made available. 
This file never changes but I thought it was easier to generate it from the makefile than 
to add another source file somewhere with these two lines in it. 
120 
CONSTRUCTORS.ee (7.1.2) - Output of Proxify++ with stubs for all constructors that 
were marked with the proxiable keyword. Used to generate CONSTRUCTORS.h. 
CONSTRUCTORS.h (7.3.2) - Output of'Constcollect'run on CONSTRUCTORS.ee. Con-
tains an invocation of the CONSTRUCTQ macro for each constructor. Included in CON-
STRUCTORINSTALLERS.ee which is linked with the proxied module and Constructors.s 
which is linked with applications. 
$(MODULENAME)STUBS.cc (7.1.2, 7.3.2) - Method stubs for use when a application-
defined method "inherits" from a proxied class. This filename contains $(MODULE-
NAME) because of the g++ compiler which does not allow linking in two files with the 
same source name together. This is linked with applications. 
$(MODULENAME)VERSIONS.cc (7.9) - Contains an invocation of the VERSIONQ mac-
ro for every proxied class including a string that is the output of the 'date' command. This 
filename contains $(MODULENAME) because of the g++ compiler which does not allow 
linking in two files with the same source name together. This is linked with applications. 
NEWCONSTRUCTORS.h - The "new" copy of CONSTRUCTORS.h. The "new" files are 
the files that are first generated; to prevent unnecessary recompilations the corresponding 
non-'new' file is only updated if the file changes. 
NEWSTUBS.ee - The "new" copy of $(MODULENAME)STUBS.cc. 
NEWVERSIONS.ee - The "new" copy of $(MODULENAME)VERSIONS.cc. 
NewAHIncludes.ee - The "new" copy of AUIncludes.ee. 
NewProxyIncludes.ee - The "new" copy of ProxyIncludes.ee. 
NewTableOnlyProxyIncludes.ee - The "new" copy of TableOnlyProxyIncludes.ee. 
PROVIDEDVERSIONS.ee (7.9) - Identical to $(MODULENAME)VERSIONS.cc except 
invokes PROVIDEDVERSIONQ macro instead of VERSIONQ macro. Linked with the 
proxied module. 
PROXYTABLES.ee (7.1.2) - Output of Proxify++ that contains the proxy tables. Linked 
with the proxied module. 
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ProxyIncludes.ee (7.2) - The list of header files to be proxified. Used as the main input to 
Proxify++. Generated from the $(PROXYINCLUDES) make variable. 
TableOnlyProxyIncludes.ee (7.2) - The list of header files to be proxified with proxy table 
only. Included from ProxyIncludes.ee. Generated from the $(TABLEONLYPROXYIN-
CLUDES) make variable. 
TableOnlyProxyVersion.ee (7.9) - Contains an invocation of the VERSIONQ macro which 
is updated whenever any of the files listed in the $(TABLEONLYPROXYINCLUDES) 
make variable change. This is only generated for the "System" $(MODULENAME), 
although perhaps instead there should be one generated for each module with the ver-
sion string name including $(MODULENAME). This contents of this file is copied into 
NEWVERSIONS.ee so it is used by both the proxied module and applications. 
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